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Tax Treaties For Investment And Aid To
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study
Allison Christians

Abstract

Tax treaties are believed to increase cross-border trade and investment by reducing international tax burdens. The pursuit of tax treaties is therefore advanced as
an integral component of U.S. foreign aid policy, which increasingly favors indirect assistance in the form of fostering trade and investment over traditional direct
assistance in the form of donor funding. The importance of tax treaties is especially advanced in the context of U.S. relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, where
poverty-related conditions are extreme and foreign trade and investment minimal.
Yet despite many years of consistent promotion there are currently no tax treaties
between the United States and the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
This article explains the apparent contradiction by presenting as a test case a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana. The case study illustrates that in
today’s global commercial climate, traditional tax treaties provide few tax benefits
to and indeed may negatively impact private investors. Consequently, the continuing absence of tax treaties can be explained by the lack of incentives for private
investors to pressure the U.S. government to conclude these agreements. This article concludes that means other than increasing the international network of tax
treaties must be pursued if the goal to increase trade and investment to developing
countries is to be achieved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. is committed to increasing trade and investment to less
developed countries (LDCs),1 particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa,
∗
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1
There is no uniform convention for the designation of a country as “less developed.”
The term is generally used to reflect a country’s economic status or growth potential. In
the context of taxation, these labels may be used to distinguish “in a general way between
countries with highly developed, sophisticated tax systems and those whose tax systems are
1
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where poverty-related conditions are extreme and foreign trade and
investment minimal.2 This commitment is demonstrated in U.S. efforts to
negotiate agreements to eliminate trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas
with many of these countries.3 U.S. officials also consistently proclaim a
commitment to enter into tax treaties with LDCs,4 on the theory that tax
treaties can eliminate excessive taxation and therefore help to increase trade
at an earlier stage of development.” VICTOR THURONYI, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING,
xxvii (1996). In the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) delineates three
categories in a hierarchy, consisting of 35 “developed countries,” 27 “former
USSR/Eastern Europe,” and 172 “less developed countries” (all other recognized countries,
including all of Sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa). See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2004 (hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK 2004), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (LDCs defined in Appendix B). As a rough
guide to U.S. foreign policy, this article incorporates these terms. For a discussion of the
arbitrary and often unyielding nature of these designations despite changes in a particular
country’s economic status or prospects, see What’s in a name?, THE ECONOMIST, January
17th 2004.
2
Since the late 1980s, increasing trade with and investment in LDCs has become a
preferred means of providing aid to such countries. See, e.g., Paul B. Thompson, THE
ETHICS OF TRADE AND AID 2 (1992); see also Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of
U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 G.
W. INT’L L. REV. 331, 384 (2003) (the “official policies” of the U.S. are “to mobilize
private capital rather than foreign aid”). For an overview of poverty conditions and foreign
investment in African nations, see, e.g., UNCTAD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
AFRICA: PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL 1, 2, 21 (United Nations 1999) (foreign investors
typically associate Africa with “pictures of civil unrest, starvation, deadly diseases and
economic disorder,” and foreign investment “inflows into Africa have increased only
modestly” since the 1980s).
3
The main agreement is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade
preference agreement, discussed infra at note 18. The U.S. is also currently negotiating a
free trade agreement with the South African Customs Union (comprised of South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland). See United States Trade Representative,
Background
Information
on
the
U.S.-SACU
FTA,
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
Southern_Africa_FTA/Background_Information_on_the_U.S.-SACU_FTA.html.
4
See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dept. Press Rel. JS-1809, Treasury Welcomes Entry into
Force of U.S.-Sri Lanka Income Tax Treaty (July 22, 2004) (“The Treasury Department is
committed to continuing to extend and broaden the U.S. tax treaty network, including new
agreements with emerging economies”), SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 108TH
CONG., HEARING ON JAPANESE AND THE SRI LANKA TAX PROTOCOL (February 25, 2004),
2004 WL 363565 (F.D.C.H.) (“we are trying to expand the scope of these treaties to
developing countries”), and Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 450 (1996) (“tax treaty expansion in this area is a high Treasury
priority”). The U.S. currently has 16 tax treaties with LDCs: Barbados, China, Cyprus,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
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and investment between the partner countries. As such, tax treaties appear
to be a perfect complement to trade agreements in furthering U.S. efforts to
increase trade and investment to LDCs. Yet there are currently no tax
treaties in force between the U.S. and any of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan
Africa.6
The lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan
Africa cannot be explained by disinterest or lack of support on the part of
academics, practitioners, or lawmakers. Representatives from all sectors
have urged the importance of concluding these agreements.7 Neither can
the omission be attributed to disinterest on the part of the LDCs in Sub-

5

This theory has been officially propounded since the first independent U.S.-LDC
treaty was contemplated. See John F. Dulles, Letter of Transmittal to the President, July 9,
1956, reprinted in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 1445 (1962) (Proclaiming
that a treaty with Honduras would increase U.S. investment in that country because “by
eliminating double taxation….[tax treaties] have contributed much to the trade and
investment flowing between [partner] countries and the United States”). For a recent
restatement of the theory, see Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on Pending Income Tax Agreements, February 25, 2004
(in regards to a proposed treaty with Sri Lanka, “[t]he goal of the tax treaty is to increase
the amount and efficiency of economic activity” between the partner countries).
6
The U.S. tax treaty network at one time included ten LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa,
pursuant to extensions of existing tax treaties with the U.K. and Belgium. All of these
treaties were subsequently terminated. Treasury Dept. News Rel. (R-2222, July 1, 1983).
Today, the only Sub-Saharan African country with a U.S. tax treaty is South Africa, which
is considered to be a developed country. See supra, note 1. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Liberia
each have a treaty with the U.S. that deals solely with the taxation of income from shipping
and aircraft activity; these agreements are largely unnecessary due to parallel provisions in
U.S. domestic tax law. See Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (hereinafter, IRC)
§ 883.
7
See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules
Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 45, 46
(2002) (arguing for tax treaties between the U.S. and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa);
Calvin J. Allen, United States Should Expand Tax Treaty Network in Sub-Saharan Africa,
34 TAX NOTES INT’L 20 (March 19, 2004) (same); Statement by Michael A. Samuels,
House Ways and Means (August 1, 1996), 1996 WL 433282 (F.D.C.H.) (“Given the vital
role that investment must play in the development of African countries…the new policy
must contain several key investment-related priorities, including an emphasis on bilateral
investment and tax treaties.”); Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing (March 25, 2004), 2004 WL 623421 (F.D.C.H.) (supporting legislation that
“directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek negotiations regarding tax treaties with
[AGOA] eligible countries”); and Charles B. Rangel, The State of Africa: The Benefits of
The African Growth and Opportunity Act—Next Steps, 149 CONG. REC. E1464-01, 2003
WL 21643348 (July 14, 2003) (stating that the U.S. should negotiate tax treaties with
AGOA countries).
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Saharan Africa themselves.8 Many of these nations have long pursued tax
treaties with the U.S,9 and a few have gone so far as to formally and
publicly express their interest in commencing negotiations with the U.S.10
Finally, the lack of tax treaties cannot be charged to a lack of real
commitment on the part of the U.S. to conclude agreements that will
increase trade and investment to and assist in the economic growth of the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.11 This commitment has already been
demonstrated through the making of significant concessions, including the
foregoing of revenue in the form of direct aid as well as reduced tariffs, in
the context of trade and aid agreements with these countries.12

8

All of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are in urgent if not desperate need for foreign
capital, and most are responding to the need by implementing measures to make their
countries more attractive to foreign investors. Given the powers ascribed to tax treaties in
increasing trade and investment between partner countries, most LDCs would pursue the
opportunity to commence negotiations with the U.S. (provided that the concessions
required to secure such agreements are not too great).
9
For example, Nigeria began pursuing a tax treaty with the United States in 1978, after
it unilaterally withdrew from its coverage under an extension of the 1945 tax treaty
between the U.K. and the U.S (as a former U.K. territory). See supra note 6 (discussing the
treaty extension), and Announcement 78-147, 1978-41 I.R.B. 20 (Oct. 10, 1978)
(terminating the treaty). Although it was apparently negotiated at length, the tax treaty was
never completed.
10
Calvin J. Allen, Botswana, Burundi Wish to Negotiate Tax Treaties with United
States, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 1264 (2002). This is a rather unusual event, since tax treaties
are generally commenced and negotiated in secret. Their existence is usually made public
after negotiations have concluded and the treaty has been signed by the respective
countries, pending ratification. RICHARD E. ANDERSEN & PETER H. BLESSING, ANALYSIS
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES, ¶ 1.04[1][a][i], [ii], 1998 WL 1038746. Thus,
countries don’t usually issue public proclamations regarding their desire to enter into tax
treaties. Similarly, since there is little public disclosure regarding progress in treatymaking by the U.S. Treasury Department, there is little means to determine the reaction, if
any, Treasury has had to these or other requests to initiate negotiations.
11
See Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax
Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139, 148-149 (2003)
(pointing to the number of U.S. treaties with other emerging economies as evidence that
“the lack of U.S. treaty-making with [LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa] cannot be explained
solely by a general reluctance to enter into tax treaties with less developed or non-capitalist
countries”); Richard Mitchell, United States-Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty
Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 225 (1997) (“the United States
displays eagerness to enter into tax treaties with developing nations”).
12
The main agreements are the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a
preferential trade regime, discussed infra at note 18, and the recently introduced
Millennium Challenge Act, an aid package tied to countries’ demonstrated commitment to
growth through investment and trade, discussed infra at note 19 .
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That the lack of tax treaties cannot be explained by disinterest, lack of
support, or lack of commitment on the part of individuals or governments
suggests that there must be some other reason or reasons that tax treaties
have not been concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan
Africa. This article explores some of these reasons by presenting as a test
case a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana, one of the LDCs
of Sub-Saharan Africa.13 Hypothesizing the structure and operation of a tax
treaty between these two countries provides a vehicle for measuring the
potential effect of such a treaty on international commerce. The case study
demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate, a typical tax treaty would
not provide significant tax benefits to current or potential investors.
Consequently, there is little incentive for these investors to pressure the
U.S. government to conclude tax treaties with many LDCs.
There are of course any number of other reasons why tax treaties may
not be concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa,
including competing priorities, either for tax treaties with other countries or
for other domestic or international tax matters. Undoubtedly, socio-political
factors play an important role as well.14 However, this article argues that
since tax treaties with LDCs like Ghana would not provide major tax
benefits to the private sector, two results occur.
First, not surprisingly, there is likely to be little private sector demand or
support for the conclusion of these agreements. Second, there is little
reason to believe that, even if concluded, tax treaties between the U.S. and
Sub-Saharan Africa could ever have the significant impact on cross-border
investment and trade so consistently proclaimed by treaty proponents. This
article concludes from these observations that if the U.S. is truly committed
to increasing investment and trade to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, an
examination of how the global tax climate has changed is in order. We
must acknowledge that tax treaties cannot deliver the promised benefits, and
examine the factors that prevent them from so doing.
An overview of the background and function of tax treaties and their
proclaimed benefits are discussed in Part II of this article. Part III presents
the case study of a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana and
shows that such a treaty would produce few tax benefits to current or
13

Ghana was chosen as a subject for this case study for several reasons, including its
existing commercial ties to the U.S., as described in Part III.
14
For example, there may be national interests at stake, such as security, defense, or
energy supply issues, that may contribute to the prioritization of concluding tax treaties
with LDCs in other areas of the world, such as Sri Lanka (concluded in 2004) and
Bangladesh (currently pending ratification). The various foreign policy goals that motivate
the agenda for treaty-making is a subject that deserves much attention, but is beyond the
scope of this article.
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potential investors and would therefore be largely ineffective in stimulating
trade and investment between these two countries. Part IV concludes that
after decades of adherence to the promise of tax treaties, we must
acknowledge their failure to deliver, and search for alternative ways to
achieve the goal of promoting aid through the vehicles of investment and
trade.
II. BACKGROUND: TAX TREATIES, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE
This Part provides the context for a discussion of the role of tax treaties
in delivering investment and aid to LDCs. Section A describes some of the
strategies employed by the U.S. to assist LDCs, and how tax treaties
comport with these strategies. Section B explains the role tax treaties play
as the locus of international tax law, by outlining the purposes and goals
that surrounded the origin and evolution of these agreements. Section C
discusses the limitations that arise because international tax law concepts
are embodied in a network of overlapping, varying, and mostly bilateral
agreements between select nations, and introduces some of the problems
faced by the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, which operate largely outside of
this network.
A.

U.S. Strategy for Assistance to LDCs

As discussed in the introduction, the U.S. has adopted a foreign aid
strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa that centers on the idea that creating
investment and trade opportunities for LDCs will most effectively boost
economic growth in these countries, thereby lifting them out of poverty
through commercial interaction with the global community.15 A key
component of this foreign aid strategy is therefore the identification and
elimination of barriers to trade and investment. Among the most significant
potential barriers are double taxation, which occurs when two countries
impose similar taxes on the same taxpayer in respect of the same income,
regulatory barriers, such as exchange and other market controls, and tariffs.
These barriers have historically been addressed in very different ways.
Regulatory barriers and tariffs have been addressed by most countries in
a generally uniform manner through regional and global trade agreements.16
The main multilateral agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), with respect to which 147 countries are signatories through
15

See supra, note 2.
Regulatory barriers are also addressed, to a lesser extent, in bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), as discussed at Part III.D, infra.
16
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the World Trade Organization (WTO). Additional tariff and regulatory
barrier reduction between the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa has been
accomplished through The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),
an agreement that seeks to increase growth and alleviate poverty through
the elimination of tariffs and quotas for selected imports from designated
Sub-Saharan African nations,18 and the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003
(MCA), a new official direct assistance initiative that will direct foreign aid
only to countries demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction through
economic growth.19
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD),20 the harmful effects of double taxation on cross17

37 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are members of the WTO. These GATT
and
other
agreements
are
available
on
the
WTO
website
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm.
18
The Trade and Development Act of 2000, H. R. 434-21, 19 U.S.C. 3721, more
commonly known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA I), as amended by
Section 3108 of The Trade Act of 2002 (AGOA II), and as further amended by The AGOA
Acceleration Act of 2004, signed by President Bush on July 12, 2004 (AGOA III; the three
acts are collectively referred to herein as AGOA). AGOA eliminates “competitive need
limitations” (quotas) and tariffs on over 1,800 items that would otherwise be subject to
such constraints under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (unless
otherwise exempt under a free trade agreement). AGOA § 103(2); see also USITC
Publication
3653
(2004),
available
at
www.usitc.gov;
see
also
http://www.agoa.gov/faq/faq.html#q17. AGOA is a preferential trade regime, rather than a
free trade agreement. For a discussion of AGOA and other trade and aid initiatives entered
into with Sub-Saharan Africa over the past several years up to 2002, see Brown, supra note
7, at 45, 49-51. As of March, 2005, 36 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa were eligible
for AGOA benefits. For a list of currently-eligible countries, see the AGOA website, at
http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html
19
The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-199, Division D; see Bill to
Establish Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, S.
571, 108th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 6, 2003. For information on the MCA, see the MCA
website, available at http://www.mca.gov/; see also Colin Powell, Welcome Message from
The Honorable Colin L. Powell, available at http://www.mca.gov/ (stating that the MCA
“reflects a new international consensus that development aid produces the best results when
it goes to countries that adopt pro-growth strategies for meeting political, social and
economic challenges.”). The MCA is not solely directed at Sub-Saharan Africa, but over
half of its currently identified recipient countries are located in this region.
20
The OECD is an international organization consisting of 30 member countries, all of
which are developed countries with the nominal exception of South Korea, which the CIA
still considers an LDC despite its per capita GDP of $17,800, well over the typical $10,000
threshold separating developed from less-developed, and despite the fact that just 4% of the
population is considered to be living in poverty conditions. See WORLD FACTBOOK 2004,
supra note 1 (Appendix B provides a definition of LDCs that includes the “Four Tigers,” a
group which includes South Korea, and country data on South Korea provides GDP and
poverty statistics, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
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border trade and investment “are so well known that it is scarcely necessary
to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation
presents to the development of economic relations between countries.”21
The U.S. government mirrors this sentiment, identifying the elimination of
“tax barriers” as a major component of its dedication “to eliminating
unnecessary barriers to cross-border trade and investment.”22
Yet, unlike other barriers to trade and investment, double taxation has
not been reconciled on a global scale. Instead of a world tax organization to
coordinate efforts and resolve disputes,23 relieving double taxation remains
the purview of individual countries.24 Nevertheless, a consensus has
ks.html). As discussed below, the OECD developed and continually updates a model
income tax convention that both encapsulates and sets international tax standards.
21
OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
ON CAPITAL 7 (Jan. 28, 2003).
22
Treasury Press Release JS-1786, supra note 5; see also Treasury Press Release JS1267, Treasury Welcomes Senate Approval of New U.S.-Sri Lanka Tax Treaty (March 26,
2004), at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1267.htm (stating that the new treaty with
Sri Lanka is “an important step in our ongoing efforts to broaden the reach of our tax treaty
network.”); Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4 (“This new tax treaty
relationship will serve to eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment
between the two countries…[by providing] greater certainty to taxpayers with respect to
the tax treatment of their cross-border activities and [reducing] the potential for double
taxation of income from such activities.”)
23
See “What is the WTO?,” at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.
The several international organizations concerned with
standardizing and coordinating global taxation do not approach the level of member
country participation in the WTO. For example, the OECD is one of the primary
international organizations that concerns itself with setting standards for international
taxation, but it has only 30 members, few new members are added (the latest addition was
the Slovak Republic, in 2000), and many countries with rapidly growing economies, such
as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are not members.
24
The vast majority of international agreements that address the problem of double
taxation are bilateral. However, there are a few regional multilateral tax treaties currently
in force, including the Andean Pact Income Tax Convention between Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (November 16, 1971); the Arab Economic Unity Council
Tax Treaty between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Y.A.R.)
(December 3, 1973); the Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States of the
Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains and for the
Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment between the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) countries of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Trinidad and Tobago (July 6, 1994); the Tax Convention Between the Member States of
the West African Economic Community (C.E.A.O.) between Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal (October 29, 1984); the Agreement on the Avoidance
of Double Taxation on Personal Income and Property, signed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
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emerged regarding the appropriate tax treatment of cross border investment
activity.25 Under this consensus, double taxation is addressed primarily by
tax treaties, which allocate tax revenue among jurisdictions based on
concepts of residence and source.26
Thus, the United States, along with the rest of the developed world, has
a network of tax treaties, spanning most of its major trading partners across
the globe.27 Expanding the tax treaty network is alternately termed a
commitment, an ongoing effort,28 and the “primary means” for the
elimination of tax barriers to international trade and investment.29 Officials
from other countries echo these sentiments.30
From the perspective of LDCs, a major problem with embodying
international tax laws in tax treaties is that LDCs typically have few of these
treaties in place. But the tax treaty network, with its central role in the
evolution of international tax law, directly affects these countries regardless
of their level of inclusion. To demonstrate the extent of this influence, the
following Section discusses why and how tax treaties became the source of
international tax law, and explores the impact the international tax system
has had on the conclusion of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of
Sub-Saharan Africa.31

Germany (G.D.R.), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, and still
in force with respect to various successor states (May 27, 1977); and the Convention
Between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital, between Denmark, the Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden (September 23, 1996) (generally based on the OECD Model).
25
For an introduction to the evolution of international taxation from decisions and
compromises made by the U.S. and the League of Nations in the 1920s to the “flawed
miracle” that exists today, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal For Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).
26
Id.
27
See discussion infra, text at notes 96 and 97.
28
Treasury Press Release JS-1267, supra note 22.
29
Treasury Press Release JS-1786, supra note 5. See also Treasury Press Rel. JS1809, supra note 4, and Gregory F. Jenner, U.S. Treasury Thanks Senator for Comments on
Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD 83-16 (Apr. 22, 2004) (“Income tax treaties
can serve the important purpose of addressing tax-related barriers to cross-border trade and
investment”).
30
For example, Bangladeshi officials assert that when the new treaty between the U.S.
and Bangladesh enters into force, it “will encourage U.S. investment in the education,
highway, and communication sectors in Bangladesh,” U.S. Treaty Update, 15 J. of Int’l
Tax. 4 (December 2004).
31
See, e.g., Michael A. Samuels, supra note 7, Richard G. Lugar, supra note 7, and
Charles B. Rangel, supra note 7.
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B.

Origins of Tax Treaties as International Law

Every country establishes its jurisdiction to impose income taxation
under sovereign claim of right. In the U.S., the taxation of income from
international transactions turns on whether the income is earned by a
resident32 or a non-resident.33 In the case of residents, the U.S purports to
tax “all income from whatever source derived.”34 In the case of nonresidents, the U.S. taxing jurisdiction is generally limited to income derived
from investments and business activities carried out in the U.S.35 Most
developed countries similarly impose worldwide, or residence-based,
income taxation on residents, and source-based taxation on income earned
within their borders.36 As a result, ample potential exists for double
taxation of transactions between two developed countries.37 The U.S. and
most of the other countries that impose worldwide taxation therefore
provide a foreign tax credit, which removes the residence-based layer of tax
while preserving the source-based layer.38 Thus, the U.S. and most other
countries generally relieve double taxation on a unilateral basis, under
statutory law.

32

Whether individual or entity; see IRC § 7701(a)(1).
IRC §§ 7701, et seq.
34
IRC § 61, see also IRC § 1 and 11(a), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1-1(c) and 1.11-1(a). The
authority to extend its jurisdiction in this broad fashion is confirmed by Cook v. Tait, 265
U.S. 47 (1924) (“the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon
the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and
cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the
United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the
latter to him as citizen”).
35
IRC §§ 871, 881-882.
36
OECD countries generally impose some form of worldwide taxation, although a few
(Austria, Australia, and Switzerland) provide certain statutory exemptions, and many
provide for exemption under treaty, as discussed below. Some countries such as France are
generally source-based, or territorial systems, which generally refrain from taxing the
foreign income earned by their residents. However, these countries enforce worldwide
taxation of certain kinds of income earned in low-tax jurisdictions in order to prevent
capital flight. Thus, France imposes worldwide taxation on certain low-taxed foreign
income. For tax system features and rates, see generally Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE
CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 2004.
37
The most common form of double taxation occurs upon a residence-source overlap,
as a taxpayer’s country of residence (the home country) imposes residence-based tax on
income earned in a foreign (source, or host) country, while the host country imposes
source-based tax on the same item. Source-source and residence-residence overlaps may
also occur due to differing definitions of these concepts.
38
See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 36.
33
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The same result is attained under treaties. Treaties are contracts,
generally between two countries,39 under which the signatory countries
agree to the taxation each will impose on the activities carried out between
their respective jurisdictions.40 Because the U.S. unilaterally provides a
mechanism to prevent U.S. taxation in the event foreign taxation applies,
treaties aimed at relieving double taxation would appear to be duplicative.41
Indeed, treaties might seem unnecessary ab initio, since the U.S. provided
the foreign tax credit mechanism almost immediately following the
inception of the income tax itself, indeed decades before any tax treaties
were ever negotiated.42 Nevertheless, the U.S. began entering into tax
treaties in 1932 and the practice continues to the present.43
39

But see supra, note 24.
In the U.S., treaties have the same effect as acts of Congress, and are equivalent to
any other U.S. law. U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2; see American Trust Co. v J.G. Smyth,
247 F.2d 149 (1957); J. Samann v Commissioner, 313 F2d 461 (1963); and Dames & More
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-88 (1981). As such, they are subject to and may be overridden
by subsequent revisions in domestic law (“treaty override”) under the “last in time” rule of
IRC § 7852(d). See Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The ALI Tax Treaty
Study—A Critique and a Modest Proposal, 52 BULL. SEC. TAX’N 731, 740 (1998-1999)
(arguing that treaty override is seen as a “serious problem” because it potentially places the
U.S. in violation of existing international obligations); Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding
Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71 (1995) (discussing treaty
override in the U.S. and concluding that “these provisions embody an important contractual
principle”: that breach of an obligation is desirable when “what is gained from the party
that breaches exceeds what is lost by the party against whom the breach occurred,” thus a
breach might be appropriate as long as the United States compensates the aggrieved party).
41
See generally, Elisabeth Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in
Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428 (1963) (arguing that treaties play a
relatively small role in relieving double taxation, owing to the U.S. foreign tax credit); see
also Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939 (2000)
(showing that tax treaties are not needed to relieve double taxation, since each country
would find it in its own best interest to unilaterally relieve double taxation on its citizens
and residents).
42
After a brief and limited stint during the civil war, the income tax was re-introduced
in 1913. See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 5, 278 (2002). The foreign tax
credit was enacted quickly thereafter, in 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18. 222(a)(1),
238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-1082 (1919). Section 222(a)(1) was applicable
to individuals, 238(a) to corporations, and 240(c) defined the taxes for which credit would
be allowed.
43
The first U.S. tax treaty was signed with France in 1932 and entered into force on
April 9, 1935. Since then, the U.S. tax treaty network has grown by an average of one
treaty per year, based on the entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties ever entered into
force. The most recent treaty to enter into force is with Sri Lanka. See Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes
On Income, Mar. 14, 1985, U.S.-Sri Lanka, TIAS (entered into force Jun. 13, 2004). The
most recently signed is with Bangladesh, which was signed on September 26, 2004 but has
40
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One of the original reasons to enter into treaties was that before they
existed, there was no international standard for relieving double taxation:
the U.S. was alone in providing a comprehensive foreign tax credit that
unilaterally relieved residence-based taxation.44 The effect of unilateral
relief of double taxation was seen as a “present of revenue to other
countries,” for whom the possibility of source-based taxation was
preserved.45 In stark contrast, Britain imposed worldwide taxation and
provided a foreign tax credit that was extremely limited and generally
preserved its residence-based taxation.46 Other European nations, especially
Italy and France, relied heavily on source-based taxation and therefore
vigorously defended the U.S. position of ceding residence-based taxation to
that of source.47
The conflicting views of the U.S. and the U.K. about the proper method
for relieving double taxation prompted several years of debate out of which
a consensus finally emerged.48 Under this consensus, “personal taxation”
not yet entered into force. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income, Sept. 26, U.S.-Bangl.,
TIAS; see also Muhammad Kibria, Bangladesh, United States Sign Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD
188-3 (Sep. 28, 2004).
44
H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 COL. J. TRANSN’L. L. 359 (1981); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear,
The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1023 (1997).
45
Edwin R. A. Seligman, Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation, 13335 n.10 (1928). Source-based taxation was even enhanced to the extent the foreign
country’s tax rates were lower than that of the U.S. In such cases, foreign countries could
raise their tax rates to the U.S. level with the assurance that these taxes would be creditable
in the U.S., leaving the investor indifferent as to the higher foreign rate. See Richard E.
Caves, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 190 (1996) (“Neutrality
depends on who pays what tax, not which government collects it.”).
46
Britain’s view was supported by the Netherlands. Both countries were primarily
capital-exporting nations, and thus the importance of preserving residence-based taxation
was high. The U.S. was also a capital-exporting nation at the time, but favored the primacy
of source-based taxation. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44.
47
Id.
48
Discussions began in the newly formed International Chamber of Commerce in
1920. In 1921 the ICC adopted a resolution that taxing jurisdiction turned on the nature of
the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and “normal” taxes. However, the
U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer adherence to the U.S. system, with
exceptions made for particular kinds of income, including that from international shipping
(as to which residence-based taxation was to be preserved) and that from sales of
manufactured goods (to be apportioned under formula). The ICC synthesized the views of
the U.S. and fourteen other countries and produced a new resolution in Rome, in 1923.
The League of Nations began to take over the discussions in 1923, using the Rome
resolutions as a basis for discussion. The compromise of the ICC as to “super” and
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was to be preserved for residence-based taxation, and “impersonal taxation”
was to be preserved for source. How these terms would be defined and
implemented in the context of the then vastly differing tax systems
depended on long and contentious negotiations, held under the auspices of
the League of Nations, in which the U.S. played a large part.49
Ultimately, the League of Nations promulgated a model tax treaty under
which countries would reciprocally restrict source-based taxation of passive
income items such as dividends and interest, in favor of preserving
residence jurisdiction over these items,50 and reciprocally relieve residencebased taxation on foreign-source business income, as had been done
unilaterally by the U.S. through the foreign tax credit.51 Thus, through tax
treaties, the U.S. retreated from its position of unilaterally providing foreign
tax credits. The tax concessions thereby obtained from treaty partners
reduced the revenue cost of the foreign tax credit, in accordance with the
main goal of U.S involvement in first negotiating these instruments.52
The concepts embodied in the League of Nations model treaty evolved
into a model treaty developed by the OECD in 1963 and updated
periodically since then (the OECD Model).53 The OECD Model has
become the standard upon which most of the over 2,000 tax treaties
currently in force are based.54 Following the League of Nations and OECD
standards, tax treaties minimize source-based taxation of income derived
from passive investment activity, such as dividends, interest and royalties,
and preserve residence-based taxation of these items. Once activities

“normal” taxes resurfaced in League of Nations discussions. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note
44, at 1067-1070.
49
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44.
50
Id, at 1086-1087 (citing Britain’s strong role in producing this result); Avi-Yonah
(1996), supra note 25, at 1306.
51
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44, at 1023. The League of Nations first produced a
model treaty in 1928.
52
Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and
Enterprises Abroad, 2 Int’l L. 692, 693-694 (1968) (“the American involvement was
motivated by a desire to reduce foreign taxes on American business so as to reduce the
costs of the foreign tax credit”).
53
The OECD Model was itself based on a series of model treaties promulgated by the
League of Nations. It has since been updated several times to cope with the changing
nature of business, culminating with the most recent update in 2003. Unless otherwise
noted, references in this article to the OECD Model refer to the 2003 version, which is
available at www.oecd.org.
54
Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide
Tax Treaties database, as of February, 2005, available in Lexis Nexis.
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increase to a sufficiently significant level of engagement, however, sourcebased jurisdiction again takes precedence.55
As a member of the OECD, the U.S. participated in the development of
the OECD model, but also developed its own model to reflect specific
policies (the US Model).56 First published in 1977 and most recently
updated in 1996, the US Model is based on the OECD Model in most
respects.57 One notable difference between the models is the OECD
Model’s allowance of the alleviation of double taxation either via a foreign
tax credit or by providing that the residence country will exempt the income
earned in the source country (known as exemption).58 The US Model
allows only the credit method, in keeping with its historical preference to
impose worldwide taxation and alleviate double taxation via the foreign tax
credit mechanism.59 All modern U.S. tax treaties are based on the U.S.
Model, with modifications made to reflect changes in law or policy since
the release of the latest model.60
Worldwide income taxation is typically justified on the grounds that it
promotes capital export neutrality (CEN), an efficiency principle under
which taxpayers will not differentiate between locating activities
domestically or abroad on tax grounds, since in either case the income
generally will be subject to tax at the same rate. 61 Thus, if taxation is
55

The required level of engagement is defined as a “permanent establishment” as
discussed infra.
56
Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax
Convention (September 20, 1996).
57
The Joint Committee on Taxation compares provisions of both the US and OECD
models when analyzing and describing new tax treaties entered into by the U.S.. See, e.g.,
Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka
(JCX-13-04), February 23, 2004 (explaining the use of the U.S. and OECD models in
treaty negotiations and describing ways in which the new Japan-U.S. Treaty deviates from
the U.S. and OECD models).
58
OECD Model, Art. 23A (exemption method) and B (credit method). For example,
among OECD countries, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Poland have treaties
in which they completely relinquish their residual taxation of income derived by a
permanent establishment. Ernst & Young, supra note 36. For a recent example, see
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Dec. 18, 1996, Belg.-Ecuador, U.N.T.S.
(entered into force Mar. 18, 2004).
59
See generally Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44.
60
A revised U.S. Model is apparently forthcoming from Treasury. It was originally
scheduled for release in December, 2004.
61
Capital export neutrality and its converse, capital import neutrality, discussed infra,
were first developed by Peggy Musgrave in 1969 and they have been vigorously analyzed
and debated ever since. Peggy Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment
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imposed by a source country, the U.S. as home country generally provides
an offsetting tax credit against the U.S. tax imposed on the same item of
income, leaving the U.S investor in the same tax position as if the
investment had been subject only to domestic tax.62
However, most countries, including the United States, do not
completely adhere to CEN principles. Because the U.S. generally does not
tax the foreign income of foreign companies, it is a relatively simple matter
to avoid U.S. tax on much foreign income by placing the income stream in a
foreign entity.63 In so doing, U.S. persons may defer U.S. taxation until the
foreign earnings are repatriated in the form of dividends or capital gains.64
Income: Issues and Arguments (1969). For an overview of these norms, and an argument
that capital export neutrality is generally the best principle for international taxation of both
portfolio and direct investment, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1604. See also
Caves, supra note 45 (Stating that all relevant taxes taken together are neutral if domestic
and overseas investments that earn the same pre-tax return also yield the same after-tax
return); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON
BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TAX
POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES 53-54 (Comm. Print 2002) (arguing that a worldwide tax
system promotes economic efficiency, because investment location decisions will be
governed by business considerations rather than tax considerations, and equity, because
domestic and multinational activities are treated alike, and suggesting that worldwide
taxation in some form is requisite to preserve the tax base from erosion by flight of
activities to tax havens.) A third norm, national neutrality, designates foreign taxes as a
cost of doing business abroad, thereby indicating only a deduction for such taxes in the
home country. Consequently, under national neutrality, taxpayers are discouraged from
engaging in foreign activities. Only a few countries, such as Guinea and Mauritania, base
their tax systems on national neutrality; others such as France and many of its former
African colonies including Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, the French-controlled Congo, Gabon,
and Senegal, as well as the Czech Republic and Hong Kong allow only a deduction for
certain taxes paid but provide for a foreign tax credit for such taxes under treaty. See
generally Ernst & Young, supra note 36.
62
If tax credits perfectly offset foreign taxes paid, the taxpayer is indifferent to the
allocation of the tax. See Caves, supra note 45. Most foreign tax credit systems are not
perfectly offsetting but impose limitations as to creditability of taxes based on type or
source of income and amount paid relative to domestic tax otherwise imposed. In the U.S.,
foreign taxes are currently segregated among several baskets according to the type of
income that gave rise to the tax for purposes of applying a limit on the allowable tax credit.
IRC §§ 901-904. As a result, pooling of income from low-tax countries may be
advantageous to taxpayers who have paid foreign taxes in excess of the allowable tax
credit. See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455 (1996),
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1360 (2001).
63
See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice
Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 113 (1988) (discussing the ease of
avoiding U.S. tax through foreign entities); Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1324
(arguing that as a result of the distinction between foreign and domestic companies in IRC
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Deferral of this kind is the equivalent of a statutorily optional exemption
of foreign income from U.S. taxation, as U.S. tax can be suspended
indefinitely, according to the needs and desires of the shareholders.65 Thus
deferral allows taxpayers to convert U.S. residence-based taxation to
source-based taxation when it suits their purposes.66 To protect revenues,
the U.S. has responded with a series of anti-deferral rules to prevent the
easy escape of capital.67 To date, these anti-deferral measures have largely

7701(a)(4) and (5) and the ensuing difference in taxation under IRC §§ 11(d), 881, and
882, “taxpayers can easily choose between classification as foreign or domestic according
to the formal jurisdiction of their incorporation).
64
Deferral is limited to some extent, as discussed infra, at Part III.B. However, a U.S.
person that earns active foreign income through a foreign corporation is generally not
subject to U.S. tax until profits are repatriated as a dividend or the stock is sold, under the
rules of Subpart F, §§ 951 et seq.
65
To allow deferral is therefore to provide incentives for active business operations to
be located outside of the U.S., in low-tax jurisdictions. Robert J. Peroni, Back to the
Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 987 (1997) (arguing that deferral “undercuts the fairness and efficiency
of the U.S. tax system” by allowing profits earned overseas in low-tax jurisdictions to
escape tax while equivalent domestic activities would be subject to tax). As a tax
expenditure that costs the U.S. approximately $7.5 billion per year, deferral may be viewed
as a subsidy, or tax incentive, for foreign business activities. See Analytical Perspectives,
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 287 (U.S. Government Printing
office, 2004) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/. Capital gains
may be avoidable in the context of a conversion or liquidation of a subsidiary. See Dover
v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 19 (2004) (allowing the conversion of a foreign corporate
subsidiary to disregarded entity status to avoid creation of subpart F income on its
subsequent sale), however, the IRS disagrees with this conclusion. See CCA 199937038
(June 28, 1999) (holding that proceeds from sale of subsidiary after change in classification
to disregarded entity did not escape subpart F) ; FSA 200049002 (August 4, 2000) (same)
and FSA 200046008 (August 4, 2000) (same, with sale made to related party).
66
See Peroni (1997), supra note 65.
67
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 651 (1986) (“it is generally
appropriate to impose current U.S. tax on easily movable income earned through a
controlled foreign corporations since there is likely to be limited economic reason for the
U.S. person’s use of the foreign corporation”). In practice, current taxation applies to a
significantly lesser extent than is contemplated under the subpart F rules, as these rules are
apparently “not fully effective in meeting their objectives.” Rosanne Altshuler, Harry
Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax
Rates? in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 9, 22, 28 (James R.
Hines, Jr., ed., Univ. of Chicago Pr. 2001) (Less than 50% of after-tax income of
subsidiaries located in three Caribbean tax havens was subject to current tax under subpart
F); see also Robert J. Peroni, Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious
about Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S. METH. UNIV. L.
REV. 455, 464 (1999) (“anti-deferral provisions can be readily circumvented”). For a

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20

2005]

Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid

17

been restricted to passive income items, so that deferral is still available in
the case of active income (residual taxation of which the U.S. might forego,
under the foreign tax credit, if foreign taxes are in fact imposed).
Nevertheless, the concept of residence-based jurisdiction is the default
system of most developed countries, and the protection of residence-based
taxation was (and is) therefore given as a reason—perhaps the primary
reason—for entering into tax treaties. The OECD Model, as the baseline for
the majority of the world’s tax treaties, thus represents an international
consensus that the appropriate jurisdiction to tax income arising from crossborder activity is primarily that based on residence.68 However, there are
several limitations to the reach of this consensus.
C.

Limitations on Use of Treaties as International Tax Law
1. Limited Coverage, Scope, and Uniformity

Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country has tax treaties with
all the other countries of the world. The average individual tax treaty
network comprises just 17 treaty partners, and over half of all countries
have tax treaty networks of five or fewer treaty partners.69 In addition, the
benefits of treaties are often limited to activities conducted between the two
signatory countries.70 As a result, there would have to be over 32,000
bilateral tax treaties to cover every possible cross-border transaction.71 The
U.S. would have to enter into new treaties with over 190 countries to ensure
discussion of the deferral privilege and its inconsistency with U.S. international tax
principles including the norm of capital export neutrality, see Peroni (1997), supra note 65.
68
Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1303 (stating that a “coherent international tax
regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support”); Reuven Avi Yonah, International
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1999) (arguing that the worldwide
network of tax treaties constitutes an international tax regime with definable, common
principles).
69
About 30% of countries have no tax treaties in force. For the 35 countries
considered by the U.S to be developed, the average network is about 49 treaties; for OECD
countries, the average is 60. For less developed countries, the average is 8. Compiled from
Ernst & Young, supra note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, as
of February, 2005, available in LexisNexis.
70
This is almost universally true when the U.S. is a party. See U.S. Model, Art. 22.
71
This figure is based on the assumption that there are approximately 255 independent
nations in the world today—a figure that is an estimate because sovereignty of nations is a
matter of foreign policy that varies from nation to nation. (A currently prominent example
is the case of Taiwan. See, e.g., Chen Redux: Inside the Rhetoric, There are Hints of a
Thaw all round, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 37 (discussing China’s tight grip and
world response); see also WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, supra note 1 (country data on Taiwan,
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html.)
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that its coverage spanned the globe. At its current average rate of expansion
of one new treaty per year since its first treaty was signed with France in
1935, the prospect of completing the U.S. tax treaty network in a timely
fashion appears slight.72
In addition, the OECD Model is aimed at only income taxation, to the
exclusion of other kinds of taxes, such as consumption and trade taxes.73
Thus the term “double taxation” refers more particularly to double income
taxation, and the term “relief of double taxation” refers particularly to the
alleviation of circumstances in which two countries assert income taxation
on the same item of income. 74 Yet, there are a number of other taxes
applied on businesses and individuals. Increasingly prominent throughout
the world are consumption taxes, and, in developed countries, social
security and other payroll taxes. As these taxes increase in application, tax
treaties may cover a shrinking portion of revenues collected by countries.
Finally, as contracts forged through negotiation, individual treaties
deviate to various degrees from the standards set in the OECD Model.75
72

Compiled from first entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties ever in force.
For reasons owing to historical distinctions that may be less clear today, income
taxes have generally been attended to in tax treaties, while trade taxes are addressed in
trade agreements. See generally Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1621 (2001); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Joel Slemrod, Treating Tax Issues Through
Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1683 (2001); and Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV.131 (2001).
74
The OECD Model describes double taxation as “the imposition of comparable taxes
in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject-matter and for
identical periods.” OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 7 (Jan. 28, 2003).
75
Even if their language is similar or identical, tax treaties may also vary due to
differing interpretations under the domestic law of each country, or, in the case of U.S.
treaties, pursuant to the agreement of the competent authorities. This is authorized under
Art. 3, para. 2 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which states that any term not defined in
the treaty is defined under the laws of each country as of the time the treaty is applied—i.e.,
“internal law, as periodically amended.” Postlewaite & Makarski, supra note 40, at 741
(adding that “[w]hen countries take different approaches to treaty interpretation, serious
consequences may result, such as double taxation or the avoidance of any taxation.”). The
US Model adds, “or the competent authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the
provisions of Article 25 (the Mutual Agreement Procedure).” Variation among treaties is
also authorized under Art. 25 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which states that the
competent authorities “shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or
doubts arising as to the interpretation or application” of the treaty, and that the competent
authorities “may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not
provided for” in the treaty. The US Model adds that the “competent authorities also may
agree to increases in any specific amounts …to reflect economic or monetary
developments.” US Model, Art. 25, para. 4. Finally, treaties may deviate from the
international consensus even if they closely follow the model treaties due to periodic
73
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Treaties among OECD member countries generally adhere to the pattern
and main provisions of the OECD Model.76 However, treaties between
developed and less-developed countries often contain non-standard
provisions. These provisions generally derive from a third model tax
convention, first promulgated by the United Nations in 1980 (the UN
Model). The UN Model was the product of a series of discussions and
meetings of an Ad Hoc Group of Experts formed in 196777 to address
concerns that the OECD Model (and, by association, the US Model) was
not appropriate for tax treaties involving non-reciprocal cross border
activity.78
2. Assumption of Reciprocal Activity
The US and OECD Models are directed at and work most effectively
between two nations that export capital and transfer services in roughly
reciprocal amounts. When treaty countries export and import capital to
each other, each acts as a source country to investors from the other. Under
these circumstances, tax treaties coordinate taxation without necessarily
causing an imbalance in revenue allocation between the two countries:
revenues given up by countries in their “source” role are recouped in their

updates to the models and commentary thereto. For example, recent revisions to the OECD
Model commentary with respect to the definition of a permanent establishment potentially
broadens the scope of such provisions and may ultimately lead to a revision of Article 5 of
the OECD Model. See, e.g., Richard M. Hammer, The Continuing Saga of the PE: Will the
OECD Ever Get it Right? 33 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 472 (August 13, 2004) (suggesting that
the current commentary should be revised because it is “murky and ambiguous,” and
arguing for the incorporation of a clear de minimum rule in the OECD Model itself).
76
See OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL 10 (Jan. 28, 2003).
However, improvements and advances in
international business and tax practices contribute to increased deviation even among
OECD countries. Recently, so-called “double non-taxation” provisions have been
introduced in new treaties. These provisions directly contravene existing OECD
provisions. See, e.g., Michael Lang, General Report, in DOUBLE NON-TAXATION, CAHIERS
DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL vol. 89a (International Fiscal Assoc., 2004), at 77.
77
The Group of Experts included members from Latin American, North American,
African, Asian and European countries. The group also had observers from the IMF, the
International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the Organization of American States, and the
International Chamber of Commerce. UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES vii (2001).
78
See United Nations Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs (2001), supra note 34, at
viii; Mutén, supra note 284 at 3.
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“residence” role.79 Consequently, such treaties are expected to have little
revenue effect on either country.80
If instead the flow of capital moves primarily from one country to
another, reciprocity is lost. One country becomes primarily the source, or
source country, while the other becomes primarily the residence, or home
country. Because LDCs are typically capital importing countries, their
primary role under tax treaties is as source country.81 Residence
jurisdiction will therefore be minimally exercised by LDCs.82 In such
79

For example, while the U.S. may give up revenue by refraining from taxing
dividends paid to foreign persons under a treaty, it recoups the loss by collecting the full
tax on dividends paid by the foreign country to U.S. residents (without reduction under the
foreign tax credit provisions, since under the treaty, the foreign country doesn’t tax the
dividend).
80
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN REL. COMM., 105TH CONG., REPORT ON THE
TAX CONVENTION WITH IRELAND 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (“the proposed treaty is estimated
to cause a negligible change in … Federal budget receipts”); STAFF OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN REL. COMM., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED
KINGDOM 16, 17 (Comm. Print 2003) (same). The balance apparently holds even in the
case of complete exemption of source-country taxation. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE
INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA (Comm. Print 2003)
(suggesting that the new zero-rate for tax on direct dividends would provide “immediate
and direct benefits to the United States as both an importer and an exporter of capital,” and
that “[t]he overall revenue impact of this provision is unclear, as the direct revenue loss to
the United States as a source country would be offset in whole or in part by a revenue gain
as a residence country from reduced foreign tax credit claims with respect to Australian
taxes.”).
81
The flow of capital between the U.S. and an LDC typically originates from the
former and flows to the latter, although this is less true with respect to the “advanced
developing” countries, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil. See, e.g.,
Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using The
Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 198 (2003) (LDCs
are generally not typical destinations for portfolio investment); see also Statement of Leslie
B. Samuels, supra note 5 (capital flows are typically nonreciprocal between the U.S. and
LDCs). Most multinationals are resident of developed countries. Of the top 100
multinational companies (as measured by foreign assets), just five are resident in LDCs
(Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Venezuela). UNCTAD, The Top 100 TNCs,
Ranked By Foreign Assets, 2000, 01/09/02 (WIR/2002/TNCs), available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2443&lang=1. Of the top fifty
multinational companies from developing economies, none are based in the LDCs of SubSaharan Africa. UNCTAD, The Top 50 TNCs from developing economies, ranked by
foreign
assets,
2000,
01/09/02
(WIR/2002/TNCs),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2443&lang=1.
82
It may be minimally exercised even in the absence of treaties, since few LDCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa assert worldwide taxation on their residents. Among the exceptions
are Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.
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cases, a tax treaty shifts tax revenues inversely to the flow of capital. As a
result, LDCs may contract their taxing jurisdiction under tax treaties
without realizing any benefit from the corresponding contraction by the
partner country.
Non-reciprocal contraction by the LDC occurs in the context of
portfolio investment as its role as the source country requires it to reduce its
tax rates on dividends, interest, and royalties, while the residence country
preserves the right to impose full taxation on these items. Non-reciprocal
contraction also occurs in the context of active business income, as
threshold rules for taxing business income prevent source-country taxation
of certain activities, such as storing and displaying goods or building and
construction activities.83 These threshold rules are embodied in the concept
of the “permanent establishment.”
The permanent establishment rules are found in Article 5 of each of the
US, OECD, and UN model treaties. Under these rules, the source country
agrees to refrain from taxing business income unless it is attributable to
business activities that meet physical presence requirements, and even then,
in some cases, only if the activities are conducted for a given duration or
rise to a substantial enough level. Accordingly, under the US and OECD
Models, a permanent establishment is generally deemed to exist and
therefore create taxing jurisdiction if business activities are conducted
through a fixed place of business and consist of more than “peripheral or
ancillary activities,” but certain activities such as building and construction
must last more than a year.84
Responding to the non-reciprocal aspects of relationships between
developed and less developed countries, the UN Group of Experts sought to
preserve source country taxation in tax treaties in its Model. Thus, the UN
Model provides for lower thresholds by shortening the duration and
including certain activities not included in the OECD and US Models.85 For
Ernst & Young, supra note 36. Ghana, the subject of the case study presented in Part III of
this Article, generally exercises territorial taxation but imposes tax on certain repatriated
earnings. See Republic of Ghana, Internal Revenue Act of 2000 (G.I.R.A.) § 6 (residents’
assessable income includes that “accruing in, derived from, brought into, or received in
Ghana”).
83
See US, OECD, and UN Models, Art. 5.
84
See US Models, Art. 5, Sec. 3. Peripheral and ancillary activities include
exploratory or preparatory functions such as research and development, as well as activities
considered incidental to the economic source of the income, such as storage, display, or
delivery of goods. The US Model is virtually identical to the OECD Model.
85
It otherwise adheres in large part to the OECD Model, and the two have become
closer. Indeed, the relevance of the UN Model has diminished significantly and it may be
seen as irrelevant to the extent developed countries agree to higher source-based tax in their
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example, under the UN Model, a permanent establishment may arise after a
duration of as low as six months for certain activities,86 fewer ancillary
activities are excluded,87 and more income is attributed to permanent
establishments via a force of attraction rule.88 Nevertheless the UN Model
limits source-country taxation in its use of the permanent establishment
concept: in the absence of the treaty, the source country would typically
provide little or no threshold to taxation.89
In addition, the UN Group of Experts determined that in treaties
between developed and less developed countries, higher source-based
taxation of passive items would be appropriate. Just how high, however,
has not been determined. While the OECD Model provides recommended
maximum source country tax rates for dividends (5 and 15%, for direct and
regular dividends, respectively), interest (10%), and royalties (zero),90 and
tax treaties, which they have done to a significant extent. See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones,
Are Tax Treaties Necessary? 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) ( “there seems to be little need for
a separate model for developing countries”).
86
UN Model, Art. 5, para. 3. In paragraph 3(a), building and construction activities
and related supervisory activities are a permanent establishment if they last more than six
contiguous months; in paragraph 3(b), consulting services are a permanent establishment if
such services continue for a cumulative (even if non-contiguous) six months. In the OECD
model, building and construction activities must continue for more than twelve months to
constitute a permanent establishment, related supervisory activities are not included, and
there is no parallel provision regarding consulting services. For a comparison of the OECD
and UN Model permanent establishment provisions, see Bart Kosters, The UN Model
Convention and Its Recent Developments, ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULLETIN January/February
2004, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/other/unpan014878.pdf.
87
For example, in the OECD and US Models, the use of facilities or maintenance of a
stock of goods for delivery is specifically excluded from the definition of permanent
establishment, while in the UN Model it is not. Compare US and OECD models, Art. 5
para. 4 and UN Model Art. 5, para. 4.
88
The OECD and US Models provides source-country taxation only of profits that are
attributable to the permanent establishment. The UN Model includes profits attributable to
the sale of the same or similar goods or merchandise as those sold through the permanent
establishment and profits from the same or similar business activities as those conducted
through the permanent establishment. Compare US and OECD models, Art. 7 para. 1 and
UN Model Art. 7, para. 1.
89
For an argument that thresholds are appropriate, should be used even in the absence
of a treaty, and should be made more uniform (in the current models, there are different
thresholds for different activities), see Brian J. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing
Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX
TREATIES 55 (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville, and Eric M. Zolt, eds. 2003). The
permanent establishment concept has been revised and updated to adapt to changes in
business and technology over the years, but remains consistent with the original version
introduced in the first OECD Model (1963).
90
See OECD Model, Art, 10, 11, and 12, respectively.
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the US Model looks virtually identical (but provides zero source-country
taxation of interest), the UN Model leaves the source country taxation of
these items to be established through bilateral negotiations. The UN Model
thus implies that higher tax rates are appropriate in tax treaties with LDCs,
but declines to recommend exactly what rate is appropriate.91
The UN Model provisions and concepts have been used frequently in
U.S. tax treaties with developed as well as less developed countries over the
years.92 For example, the U.S. income tax treaties with the Barbados,
Canada, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Venezuela, each provide for
lower permanent establishment duration requirements, narrower definitions
of ancillary and preparatory activities, higher source-country tax rates on
passive income items, or a combination of these features.
The consequence of preserving source-country taxation to overcome
non-reciprocal capital flows, however, is that it undermines the relief of
double taxation ostensibly sought as the primary purpose for entering into
the treaty in the first place. This has been a problematic area, for it appears
to drafters and negotiators of tax treaties and treaty models to be
indeterminable whether it is better for LDCs to preserve source-country
taxation so as to collect the maximum amount of revenues, or to relieve
source-country taxation so as to attract the maximum amount of foreign
investment. Tsilly Dagan eloquently illustrated the conundrum and
presented a game theory rationale that explains why many LDCs have opted
for the latter.93 As discussed in Part III, this choice is one of the main
reasons tax treaties have become obsolete for many investors in LDCs, yet
new U.S. tax treaties with LDCs continue to be sought, and, when
concluded, they continue to provide for higher source-country taxes on
passive income items, even when the treaty rate exceeds that of the internal
laws of the LDC.94
The importance of reciprocity as requisite to make a tax treaty
appropriate is demonstrated in the current composition of the U.S. tax treaty
network. Like all developed countries, reciprocal trade and investment
partners are covered by tax treaties: the U.S. has them in place with all of its
major trading partners95 and the bulk of its foreign direct investment sources
91

See Arts. 10, 11, and 12 in each model.
Kosters, supra note 86, at 9.
93
See supra, note 41.
94
See discussion infra at note 134.
95
Major trade partners include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK.
World Factbook (2004), supra note 1. The most glaring exception in the U.S. tax treaty
92
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and destinations.96 Yet, with just 55 comprehensive tax treaties covering 62
countries, the U.S. network is comparatively small relative to the other
major economics of the world,97 and it excludes more than 20% of U.S.
foreign direct investment.98 Moreover, just 16 U.S. tax treaties are with
LDCs, 99 as compared with an average of 22 in other leading economies.100
To the extent that tax treaties influence the flow of trade and investment
between the U.S. and the rest of the world, they may impact U.S. foreign
investment, trade, and aid efforts to LDCs. The following Part explores
whether more complete U.S. tax treaty coverage could impact these flows
by considering a hypothetical tax treaty with Ghana, an LDC in SubSaharan Africa.
III. U.S. TAX TREATIES WITH LDCS: CASE STUDY OF GHANA
This Part presents as a case study a hypothetical tax treaty based on
current U.S. tax treaty standards with respect to LDCs. The case study
demonstrates that the lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of
Sub-Saharan Africa may be explained in large part by the fact that in
today’s global tax climate, these agreements would not significantly impact
the global tax burden currently faced by current or potential international
investors. As a result, even if governments commit to concluding them, and
even with support from academics, practitioners, and lawmakers, tax
network is probably Brazil, with whom negotiations have been stalled since 1992. See
infra, note 302.
96
The tax treaty network currently covers approximately 78% of U.S. foreign direct
investment, as valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in and
net outstanding loans to foreign affiliates). See Maria Borga & Daniel R. Yorgason, Direct
Investment Positions for 2003: Country and Industry Detail 40, 49 (July, 2004), available
at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2004/07July/0704dip.pdf
97
In contrast, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with over 100 countries;
Canada and the Netherlands with over 80. Ernst & Young, supra note 36, at 129, 250, 612,
938.
98
See supra, note 69.
99
See supra, note 4. When the tax treaty with Sri Lanka (signed in 1985) entered into
force in July of 2004, it was the first new country added to the tax treaty network since the
treaty with Slovenia entered into force in 2001, and the first new LDC since Venezuela was
added in 1999.
100
17 of the 30 OECD countries have larger LDCs tax treaty networks. For example,
the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with 60 LDCs, Canada has 40, Germany has 36,
Norway has 35, and Italy and Sweden each have 32. Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra
note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, as of February, 2005,
available in LexisNexis.
100
See US Model, Art. 22.
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treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa would
nevertheless be largely ineffective in stimulating cross-border investment
and trade. Section A introduces Ghana as the subject of the case study.
Section B outlines the framework of a hypothetical tax treaty between the
U.S. and Ghana.
Section C discusses the probable impact of the
hypothetical tax treaty on the flow of investment and trade between the two
countries, and demonstrates that the tax treaty is unlikely to produce
significant increases in investment and trade from the U.S. to Ghana.
A.

Ghana as the Subject of a Case Study

The pursuit of a tax treaty with Ghana, a nation of 20 million people in
West Africa, would support current U.S. commercial and non-commercial
interests in this country. Non-commercial interests of the U.S. in Ghana
include longstanding diplomatic ties101 and an interest in fostering economic
stability in this region of the world for humanitarian reasons, as well as a
recognition that conditions of extreme poverty like those found in Ghana
are a potential breeding ground for terrorism.102
U.S commercial interests in Ghana include both trade and investment
relationships. Several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are
owned by U.S. companies,103 and U.S. companies continue to express an
interest in pursuing business opportunities in this country.104 U.S.
101

See U.S. Department of State, Background Note—Ghana, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm ( “The United States has enjoyed good relations
with Ghana at the nonofficial, personal level since Ghana’s independence. Thousands of
Ghanaians have been educated in the United States. Close relations are maintained between
educational and scientific institutions, and cultural links, particularly between Ghanaians
and African-Americans, are strong.”)
102
Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, allegedly linked to the
international terrorist organization of al Qaeda, provide perhaps the most illustrative reason
for U.S. interests in brokering peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. also has
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa for social justice reasons, including the extreme poverty
faced by a majority of the population in this region. For a discussion of the importance of
pursuing tax treaties in response to these issues, see Brown, supra note 7, at 61.
103
These include the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd (Valco), a Ghanaian aluminum
manufacturing company that is jointly owned by Kaiser Aluminum Corp (a Texas
corporation owning 90%) and Alcoa Inc., (a Pennsylvania corporation owning 10%);
Regimanuel Gray, a construction company jointly owned by Regimanuel Ltd. (a Ghanaian
company) and Gray Construction (a Texas corporation);
and Equatorial Bottlers, a
bottling company wholly owned by the Coca Cola Company (a Delaware corporation).
104
See, e.g., Newmont to start up in Ghana, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Australia), December 22, 2003, Pg. 59 (discussing the purchase by Newmont Mining Corp,
a Delaware Corporation, of the Ahafo gold mine in Ghana); Elinor Arbel, AMR, Pier 1
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investment in and trade with Ghana is facilitated because, as a former
colony of the U.K.,105 Ghana’s official language is English,106 its laws are a
blend of customary law and English common law, and its regulatory state
derives much from the British system, thus providing a familiar framework
for commercial relations.107
U.S. trade and aid initiatives specifically identify Ghana as regionally
significant to U.S. trade interests due to its central location in an
international business corridor that stretches from Nigeria to Côte
d’Ivoire.108 As is the case for most LDCs,109 the U.S. is one of Ghana’s
Imports, Sun Microsystems: U.S. Equity Movers Final, BLOOMBERG NEWS, August 16,
2004, (discussing plans by Alcoa Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, to buy and restart an
aluminum smelter in Ghana); and G. Pascal Zachary, Searching for a Dial Tone in Africa,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 5, 2003, sec. C., p. 1, col. 2 (quoting a former senior executive
of Microsoft who surveyed Ghana as a potential regional hub for an informationtechnology industry, who stated that Ghana “has the potential to become for Africa what
Bangalore became for India,” and discussing Rising Data Solutions, a Maryland
corporation that recently introduced a call center in Ghana and Affiliated Computer
Services, a Dallas company that began doing business in Ghana in 2001 and is looking to
expand its operations).
105
Seventeen LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa are former colonies of the U.K.: Botswana,
The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; all but
Somalia and Tanzania designate English as their official language; an additional four
countries list English among their official languages. See World Factbook (2004), supra
note 1.
106
The use of English may be an important factor for the foreign investment location
decisions of U.S. Multinational firms. See Kravis & Lipsey, The Location of Overseas
Production and Production for Export by US Multinational Firms, NBER Working Paper
No. W0482 (August 1982), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262704.
107
U.S. Multinational companies may prefer to invest in countries with which they
have “economic, political, language, or cultural ties.”
John H. Dunning, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BUSINESS 41 (1993) (discussing “geographical clustering” of
multinational companies).
108
2003 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward SubSaharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act 5 (May
2003). Ghana is also poised to be the financial hub of a West African monetary zone
(WAMZ) that is expected to be established in July, 2005. See, e.g., Hon. Yaw OsafoMaafo, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, The Budget Statement and Economic
Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2004 Financial Year (February, 2004), para. 43.
When established, the WAMZ will facilitate commerce in the region by introducing a
single currency (the ECO) in the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo.
For information on ECOWAS, see the organization’s website at
http://www.sec.ecowas.int/.
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principal trading partners, although U.S. goods comprise a small portion of
Ghana’s total imports.110 As a result, like most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Ghana is a relatively untapped market for U.S. exports.111
Current trends in U.S. trade and investment interests in Ghana support
the notion that increasing investment in this country is a viable goal, and
that the goal is being met by current efforts in executing international
agreements. For example, U.S. trade with Ghana increased following the
enactment and implementation of AGOA.112 Nevertheless, U.S. investment
in Ghana remains relatively slight, by global standards.113 Low levels of
investment in Ghana may be explained by a number of factors including
several non-tax barriers to investment. Ghana’s low level of infrastructure
has been blamed as a major impediment to increased investment.114
109

The U.S. is a principal export partner to 65% of LDCs, and a principal import
partner to 62%. Compiled from WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, supra note 1.
110
See U.S. Department of State, Ghana Country Commercial Guide FY2002,
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr109073e.html (stating
that “in the past, Ghana conducted most of its external trade with Europe, but trade with the
United States is becoming increasingly significant”). Ghana’s import market is currently
dominated by Nigeria (contributing 21% of all imports), followed by the U.K. with 7.2%.
Along with the U.S., China, Italy, and Côte d’Ivoire each contribute approximately 6% of
total imports. In comparison, the U.S. is currently a principal exporter to 20 other LDCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing over 50% of imports in Namibia, about 30% in Chad and
Equatorial Guinea, and about 15% in Eritrea and Angola. World Factbook (2004), supra
note 1.
111
As a potential export market, Ghana and other LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are also
important to the U.S. labor market. See John Cochran, Bush Visits Africa — But Why
Now?,
ABC
NEWS
REPORT
(July
8,
2003),
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/africa030708_bush.html (over 100,000 U.S.
jobs depend on exports to Africa).
112
Since 2000, when AGOA was first implemented, U.S. exports to Ghana have
grown steadily but imports from Ghana have decreased. United States International Trade
Commission, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, available at
http://reportweb.usitc.gov/Africa/trade_balance.jsp.
113
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2003) (hereinafter, “WIR 2003”), at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1465&lang=1.
114
See US. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FY2002,
Ch. 7, Part A.1. (stating that infrastructure shortcomings have impeded domestic
productivity
and
discouraged
foreign
direct
investment),
at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr109073e.html. Along with the rest of
Sub-Saharan Africa, which experienced a large and continuing decline in foreign direct
investment (FDI) in tandem with the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, Ghana’s share
of global foreign investment has dropped significantly over the past few years, and it
considered an underperformer with respect to its foreign direct investment potential. Its
40% decline in FDI from 2001 to 2002 mirrors the experience of the continent, to which
FDI declined as a whole from $19 billion in 2001 to $11 billion in 2002 (a 41% decline).
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Examples of Ghana’s infrastructural shortcomings include obvious
physical burdens such as poorly maintained roads,115 interruptions in
electricity,116 a lack of clean water,117 and a paucity of institutions such as
schools and hospitals.118 Equally problematic are Ghana’s excessive
administrative requirements and bottlenecks as well as other barriers to the
entry and operation of business by foreign persons.119 For example, Ghana
continues to struggle with land and property protection,120 restricts foreign

These declines are sharp when compared to that for global FDI, which declined as a whole
by 21% in the same period. See WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 3, 14.
115
As John Torgbenu, a taxi driver in Accra, describes the multitude of certifications
needed to obtain a cab license in Ghana: “the cars must be road-worthy, but the roads need
not be car-worthy.” See also Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the
Government of Ghana for 2003-05, March 31, 2003 (MEFP) at para. 8 (“Ghana’s basic
infrastructure continues to remain in very poor shape. The building of roads, ports, and
communication networks…have been driving forces behind the government’s efforts to
secure a predictable flow of external financing for infrastructure development”).
116
Despite the presence of West Africa’s largest hydro-electric plants at Volta Lake in
northern Ghana, electricity outages are such a frequent phenomenon that individuals,
businesses and institutions that can afford generators have them, and put them to use on a
regular basis. Fueling the modernization process is one of the key developments sought in
connection with Ghana’s requests for IMF funding. See MFEP (2003), supra note 115.
117
Ghana is among the majority of LDCs in the world that have not developed an
improved water supply. See statistics and information gathered by the World Health
Organization, at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/en/.
118
Low levels of education, literacy, and health care issues are among the institutional
issues Ghana faces. See, e.g., George Gyan-Baffour, The Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy:
Poverty
Diagnostics
and
Components
of
the
Strategy,
at
http://www.casmsite.org/Documents/Elmina%202003%20-%20Workshop%20%20Poverty%20Reduction%20-%203.pdf.
119
Much of these administrative regimes are a lasting legacy of colonization, under
which the European nations imposed severe market controls to preserve the resources of
their colonies for their exclusive use. See, e.g., FRANCIS AGBODEKA, AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF GHANA 7 – 21 (1992). For an overview of ease of entry issues for LDCs
generally, see JEFFREY C. HOOKE, EMERGING MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
CORPORATIONS, LENDERS, AND INVESTORS (2001), (discussing the entrenched obstacles to
entry in LDCs); see also Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven & Raghuram Rajan, Business
Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data, NBER Working Paper
No. 10380 (2004), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf (finding that bureaucratic
entry regulations are a significant burden that hampers the entry of firms into foreign
markets).
120
Courts in Ghana are overwhelmed with land disputes. Interview with Kwame
Gyan, Law Professor, University of Ghana-Legon, December, 2003 (notes on file with the
author.
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121

ownership of real property, and has only recently dismantled regulations
that closed several industries to foreign investors all together.122
Ghana’s current administration has pledged to make significant
improvements to its infrastructure, as part of its approach to poverty
reduction and economic growth through the building of a business-friendly
environment.123 The reduction of administrative obstacles, combined with
greater certainty with regard to the legal and regulatory regime, is credited
with a recent surge in foreign investment from South Africa to other
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.124 It is hoped that this surge will be
followed by increased investment from other countries, including the U.S.
An increased share of foreign investment is also expected to lead to
spillover effects that would remedy some of the current deficiencies in
physical infrastructure.
Limited spillover effects have been achieved
recently in connection with Ghana’s gold mining operations, which have
provided funding to improve transportation routes.125 Similarly, in Nigeria,
121

The inability to own land translates to an inability to use land as collateral for
financial transactions, which is a key to economic growth. See Enrique Gelbard,
Measuring Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 18, IMF Working Paper #
99/105 (1999), at http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/99105.html.
122
See WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 36.
123
Hon. Yaw Osafo-Maafo, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, The Budget
Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2003 Financial Year
(November, 2003), para. 22 (pledging the government’s “commitment to deliver a macroeconomic environment that underpins our strategy for growth and poverty reduction”);
Hon. Yaw Osafo-Maafo (2004), supra note 108, at para. 4 (pledging to continue to “create
an enabling environment for wealth creation). See also various documentation in
connection with IMF lending, including the MFEP (2003), supra note 115.
124
Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 4,
2003, at Section W; P. 1, Col. 3 (“It’s safer to go in, it’s easier to get materials in and out,
easier to repatriate your profits,” according to Keith Campbell, a managing director of a
South African risk management firm, and vice-chairman of the South Africa-Angola
Chamber of Commerce). The overhaul of economies has often been initiated by the
international lending organizations, which have faced much criticism and been the subject
of much debate in the face of the apparent failure of many of their reform efforts.
However, the extreme opposite approach, as unfortunately presented in the case of
Zimbabwe, illustrates the need for some fundamental certainty in dealing with foreign
businesses in order to attract foreign investment and maintain a stable economy.
125
Ghana’s gold mines have recently sparked interest from foreign investors, who will
spend millions of dollars to upgrade and develop operations following years of neglect and
under-maintenance of these operations, because they expect productivity to increase
dramatically and produce significant profit as a result. See Mr. Jonah goes to Jo’burg,
ECONOMIST, January 15, 2004 (AngloGold (South Africa) expects to spend between $250
and $500 million to upgrade its newly acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ashanti Goldfields));
Newmont to go for Ghana Gold, THE ADVERTISER, Monday, December 22, 2003, Finance
section, p. 50. (Newmont (U.S.) plans to spend about $350 million to develop its recently-
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one of Ghana’s close neighbors, investors in the telecommunications
industry funded the installation of communication networks throughout the
country.126 Ghana’s growing telecommunications industry may draw like
commitments from future investors.127 However, the components of
infrastructure that are not produced by spillover, such as the legal and
regulatory framework that protects businesses and creates an environment
for growth, must generally be directly supported and funded by the
government.128
Despite the infrastructural obstacles present in Ghana, U.S. investment
in this country continues to grow, albeit slowly. The following section
explores whether and how such investment might be affected by a tax treaty
between the two countries.
B.

Structure of a Tax Treaty between Ghana and the U.S.

As discussed in Part I, the US Model serves as the template for all new
tax treaties negotiated by Treasury, though the OECD Model and other
recent treaties are also consulted. Thus, in structure and overall content, a
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana would emulate the model treaties,
especially the US Model, to a substantial degree. However, in negotiations
acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ahafo)). See also Big-game Hunting, ECONOMIST, August
13, 2004; Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont OKs Project in Ghana; Gold Producer Invests
$350 Million in W. African Mine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, CO), December 19,
2003; and Gargi Chakrabarty, Latest Global Hot Spot For Gold Mining: Ghana, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, CO), October 30, 2003, page 1B.
126
South Africa’s Vodacom recently spent $119 million building a cellular network in
the Congo, a critically impoverished country that has only recently emerged from
devastating civil war. South Africa’s MTN Group spent approximately 1.75 billion
building cellular networks in five different Sub-Saharan Africa countries ($900 million in
Nigeria alone), and experiences a 40% profit margin in these markets—despite having to
build power generators to overcome a lack of stable power sources and a transmission
network to connect cities and towns across the country—compared to its 30% return at
home in South Africa. Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at Section W; P. 1, Col. 3.
127
See supra, note 104.
128
Coercion of various forms may induce companies to provide such infrastructure in
the absence of voluntary action. For example, in 2003, foreign workers were kidnapped in
Nigeria, in an effort to extract a promise from a foreign company to build a school and a
health center. See Nigeria’s oil-rich area mired in poverty, THE DAILY GRAPHIC (Ghana),
December 3, 2003, at p. 5. Clearly no government should be encouraged to rely on these
kinds of tactics to build adequate infrastructure, but the fact that citizens of a nation are
willing to engage in illegal acts to secure public goods illustrates the tensions and pressures
facing both international businesses and the governments struggling to attract such
businesses.
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129

with LDCs, Treasury also consults the UN Model.
As a result, these
treaties usually contain several standard deviations from the US Model,
described in reports and technical explanations as “developing-country
concessions.”130 They are called concessions because they typically
concede U.S. residence-based taxing jurisdiction in favor of greater sourcecountry taxation.131
An example of a U.S. treaty with an LDC, as compared to the US Model
Treaty, demonstrates the operation of these concessions. At the time it was
entered into, the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica was deemed the “model U.S.
treaty for developing countries.”132 At 24 years of age, that treaty is
substantially out of date, as many tax laws in the U.S. (and presumably in

129

See supra, text at note 60, and see, e.g., Department of the Treasury Technical
Explanation of the Convention Between The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
Signed at Colombo March 14, 1985, As Amended by a Protocol Signed at Washington on
September 20, 2002 (“Negotiations also took into account the [OECD Model], the [UN
Model], and recent tax treaties concluded by both countries.)
130
This designation has been consistently propounded throughout U.S. tax treaty
history, and continues virtually unchanged today. For example, compare reports prepared
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Joint Committee on Taxation in
connection with the tax treaties with India (1977), the Philippines (1989), and Sri Lanka
(2004). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95th CONG., EXPLANATION OF
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (Comm. Print
1977) (“The proposed treaty contains a number of developing country
concessions…providing for relatively broad source-basis taxation”); STAFF OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF
INDIA (1989); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA 3, 64 (Comm. Print 2004) (hereinafter, “EXPLANATION
OF SRI LANKA TREATY”) (describing these deviations as substantive, and outlining the
major provisions).
131
Id at 64. To the extent that source-based taxing jurisdiction is theoretically more
justifiable, the term concession is something of a misnomer. See discussion in Part II,
Section B. Nevertheless, as much source-based jurisdiction has been ceded in favor of
residence-based jurisdiction in the evolution of the model treaties, a reversal of this norm,
especially in the case of non-reciprocal capital flows, can in theory shift greater tax revenue
collection to the country of source. By so doing, it requires the residence-country to revert
to the role of relieving double taxation via the generosity of the foreign tax credit,
discussed supra, text at note 44. However, the theory that revenues are conceded under
these provisions only holds if the source country actually imposes and collects the tax.
This is an assumption which cannot be relied upon in today’s global economy, as discussed
infra.
132
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF JAMAICA
TREATY (Comm. Print 1981).
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Jamaica) have changed significantly since it entered into force in 1981.133
However, the principles of enlarging source-country taxation found in the
Jamaica-U.S. treaty continue to appear in new tax treaties with other
LDCs.134 Therefore, the following discussion uses the Jamaica-U.S. treaty
to model what a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty might look like, if concluded on the
basis of precedent.
In the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica, as in most tax treaties with LDCs,
the expectation that non-reciprocal capital flows may negatively impact the
LDC is addressed by preserving source-country taxation. This is mainly
accomplished through modifications to the articles dealing with the
determination of thresholds for taxing income from business activities (the
permanent establishment provision) and those dealing with the taxation of
passive-type income (dividends, interest, and royalties provisions).135
First, under the permanent establishment concept, source-country
taxation is enlarged by expanding the definition to allow the LDC to impose
taxation on more of the business profits earned by foreign persons in the
source country.
Thus, in the Jamaica-U.S. treaty, the permanent
establishment provision mirrors the structure of the U.S. and OECD
Models, but incorporates the UN Model approach, shortening the threshold
durational requirement from one year to six months in the case of
construction, dredging, drilling, and similar activities.136 It also provides
that the furnishing of services can create a permanent establishment if
continued for more than 90 days a year.137 Finally, it provides that
maintaining substantial equipment or machinery in a country for 4 months

133

Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., T.I.A.S. No. 10207,
1982-1 C.B. 257 (entered into force on December 29, 1981).
134
Evidently in some cases, this is done regardless of the pre-existing legal framework
in the LDC. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF SRI
LANKA TREATY, supra note 130, at 62 (stating that “it is not clear that …Sri Lankan laws
have been fully taken into account” since “[s]everal of the articles of the proposed treaty
contain provisions that are less favorable to taxpayers than the corresponding rules of the
internal Sri Lankan tax laws”).
135
See supra, Part II. Section C.
136
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para. 2(i). The activity must continue for “more than 183
days in any 12-month period,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a
permanent establishment.
137
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para 2(j). The services must continue for “more than 90 days
in any 12-month period” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a
permanent establishment.
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138

can constitute a permanent establishment.
One or more of these
deviations from the US Model are found in most U.S. tax treaties with
LDCs.139 Consequently, similar provisions would likely be suggested,
negotiated and agreed to in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty.
Under the passive income provisions, source-country taxation is
enlarged by allowing source-country to impose tax rates on these items of
income in excess of the maximum rates provided in the US Model. The US
Model allows source country tax rates of no more than 5% on “direct
dividends” (those paid to corporate shareholders holding at least 10% of the
paying company’s stock), 15% on “regular dividends” (all other
shareholders), and zero on interest and royalties.140 In contrast, the
Jamaica-U.S. treaty provides for source-country tax rates of 10% on direct
dividends,141 15% on regular dividends,142 12.5% on interest,143 and 10% on
royalties.144
Despite the general trend of higher source-country taxation of passive
income items in U.S. tax treaties with LDCs, source-country taxation of
certain items of passive income have recently been lowered in a number of
138

U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para 2(k). The equipment or machinery must be maintained
“for a period of more than 120 consecutive days,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable
year to constitute a permanent establishment.
139
See, e.g., India-U.S., art. 5, para. (j), (k), and (l) (providing for the same
concessions as in the Jamaica-U.S. treaty). Similar deviations are also in U.S. tax treaties
with other developed countries. See, e.g., Canada-U.S., art. 5, para 4 (providing that the
use of a drilling rig or ship for more than 3 months in any twelve-month period constitutes
a permanent establishment). Since Canada is a developed country, the Senate Report does
not mention the UN Model as a source of consultation, and the Joint Committee does not
identify the deviation as a concession by the U.S., but rather explains that “[t]he shorter
period was included in the treaty at the insistence of Canada which felt that a one-year
period was unrealistic, given the adverse conditions of drilling in the Canadian offshore
and the fact that the drilling season there is very short.” See STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM.
th
ON FOR. REL, 96 Cong. (Comm. Print 1980); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
TH
96 CONG., EXPLANATION OF TAX CONVENTION WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1980).
Narrow thresholds continue to appear in newly-signed U.S. tax treaties, such as the one
with Bangladesh. See supra note 43, at art. 5, para. 3 and 6 (not yet in force).
140
US Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12. The OECD Model differs from the US Model in
that it provides for source-country tax rates of 5% in the case of dividends held by 25% or
greater corporate shareholders, 15% in the case of all other dividends, 10% in the case of
interest, and zero in the case of royalties. OECD Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12. As discussed
in Part II, Section C, the UN Model leaves the maximum tax rate blank, implying that
countries should negotiate a higher rate in the case of treaties between developed and less
developed countries. UN Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12.
141
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 10, para. 2(a).
142
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 10, para. 2(b).
143
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 11.
144
U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 12.
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U.S. tax treaties, including one with Mexico, an LDC. The U.S. agreed to
eliminate source-country taxation on direct dividends paid with respect to
stock held by foreign controlling parent companies145 in a recent protocol to
the Mexico-U.S tax treaty.146 A most-favored nation provision in the
original treaty147 caused the elimination of source-country taxes on these
direct dividends when the U.S. negotiated the same provision in recent
treaties and protocols with Australia,148 Japan,149 and Britain.150 According
to Treasury officials, the elimination of source-country tax on direct
dividends earned by foreign controlling companies reduces tax barriers and
increases the economic ties between the partner countries.151 Following the
logic of this position, a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty should involve a significant
lowering, if not complete elimination, of source-country taxation of
dividends. The fact that the U.S. tax treaty with Mexico, an LDC, very
145

Those owning at least 80% of the foreign subsidiary’s stock.
See Second Additional Protocol that Modifies the Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income,
Nov. 26, 2002, U.S.-Mex., art. II, TIAS; see also Report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the Additional Protocol Modifying the Income Tax Convention with
Mexico, S 108-4, Sec. VI, Part A (March 13, 2003) (protocols eliminate tax on certain
direct dividends).
147
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Income Taxes, Sep. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 10, Protocol, art. 8,
TIAS (“If the United States agrees in a treaty with another country to impose a lower rate
on dividends than the rate specified … both Contracting States shall apply that lower rate
instead of the rate specified….”).
148
Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May, 2003, U.S.-Austl.,
art. 6.
149
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Nov. 6, 2003, U.S.-Japan, art 11, TIAS (entered
into force July 1, 2004).
150
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, Jul. 24, 2001, U.S.-U.K.,
art. 10, TIAS.
151
See STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
THE CONVENTION WITH JAPAN (Comm. Print 2003) (noting that many bilateral tax treaties
to which the United States is not a party eliminate taxes on direct dividends, that the EU’s
Parent-Subsidiary Directive achieves the same result, and that the United States has signed
treaty documents with the U.K. and Australia that include provisions similar to the one in
the Mexico protocol); see also Treasury Secretary John W. Snow Remarks at the U.S.Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony, November 6, 2003, (stating that the new
Japan-U.S. Treaty will significantly reduce existing tax-related barriers to trade and
investment between Japan and the United States and will foster closer economic ties
between the two countries).
146
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recently adopted this position would seem to support the expectation of a
similar provision in a tax treaty with Ghana.
However, the more likely result is that in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty,
source-country tax rates on dividends would be closer to the rates found in
the Jamaica treaty than those found in the Mexico treaty.152 In other recent
U.S. tax treaty negotiations with LDCs, none incorporate a zero rate for
dividends paid to controlling company shareholders, and all provide for
maximum source-country tax rates on passive income items that are higher
than those provided in the US Model.153
Thus, as in the case of the permanent establishment provisions, the
higher source-country rates that are typical in U.S. tax treaties with LDCs
would likely be suggested, negotiated and agreed to in a Ghana-U.S. tax
treaty.154 Using the Jamaica-U.S. treaty and other recent treaties with LDCs
as a guide, a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty could be expected to provide maximum
source-country tax rates of 10% to 15% on direct dividends, 10 to 15% on
regular dividends,155 and 10% on interest and royalties.
The narrower permanent establishment thresholds and higher sourcecountry tax rates are expected in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty because they
continue to appear in other U.S. tax treaties with LDCs. They appear in
these treaties because it is believed that they will provide some benefit to
the governments of the LDCs entering into these agreements. Yet, the
overriding purpose of these treaties is the same as that for treaties
152

The Mexico treaty now provides for a maximum of 5% source-country taxation on
direct dividends, 10% on regular dividends, and zero on direct dividends paid to foreign
companies with a controlling interest in the paying company. See Mexico Protocol of
2002, supra note 146.
153
See, e.g., Sri Lanka-U.S., supra note 43, art. 10, 11, and 12 (providing maximum
rates of 15% on all dividends, and 10% on interest and royalties); Bangladesh-U.S., supra
note 43 (same rates as in Sri Lanka-U.S. treaty). Other than the lower rates on dividends,
the Mexico-U.S. treaty is consistent with other tax treaties with LDCs in that it provides for
maximum source-country tax rates of 15% on interest and 10% on royalties. See MexicoU.S., supra note 147.
154
See the U.S. tax treaties with Greece (a developed country), the former countries of
the U.S.S.R. (each a transition country), and Trinidad & Tobago (an LDC), each providing
for a maximum 30% source-country tax rate for dividends, and those with Israel (a
developed country), India, and the Philippines (each an LDC), providing a maximum 25%
rate. The newest U.S. tax treaty, with Sri Lanka (an LDC), provides for a 15% tax rate on
all dividends. The Sri Lanka treaty was considered by the Senate in February, 2004
together with the Japan-U.S. Treaty, which provides for zero taxation on certain dividends
paid to controlling shareholders. See Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax
Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka, 108th Cong. (2004).
155
32 of the U.S. tax treaties currently in force provide a rate of 10% on regular
dividends.
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exclusively between developed countries: they are supposed to relieve
double taxation and therefore increase cross-border investment between the
partner countries. The next section explores the extent to which either of
these goals are achieved under the hypothetical tax treaty between Ghana
and the U.S. described above.
C.

Effect of a Ghana-U.S. Tax Treaty on Potential U.S. Investors

Assuming that Ghana is a viable destination for U.S. investment as
described above, a tax treaty between these two countries would
theoretically complement U.S. investment interests as well as its trade and
aid initiatives. However, this section demonstrates that in today’s global tax
climate, a tax treaty that follows the international standards set forth in the
model treaties may be ineffective in achieving its goals. This may occur as
a result of several inter-related phenomena.
First, the scope of tax treaties appears to be too narrow in the context of
these LDCs. Second, double taxation appears to be disappearing in
international transactions involving these LDCs as a result of the
widespread reduction in taxation caused by global tax competition and an
ever-increasing availability of opportunities to avoid and evade income
taxation. Third, there may be little differential between tax treaties and
statutory law in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Fourth, tax treaties may
have little impact on multinational investment behavior in the face of nontax issues, such as inadequate infrastructure, in LDCs. Finally, tax treaties
may offer little more than perception about the commercial and legal
climate of a country for foreign investment.
Because of the impact of each of these factors on global commercial
activity, a tax treaty between Ghana and the U.S. would yield an
insignificant impact on investment and trade between these two countries.
Each of these factors, and their effect on the potential impact of a tax treaty,
is discussed below.
1. Non-Comparable Taxation
The first phenomenon that tends to reduce the potential benefit of a tax
treaty between the U.S. and Ghana is the fact that U.S. multinationals are
likely to face non-income taxation in Ghana.156 Like many LDCs, Ghana
relies on a broad range of taxes that are not relieved under treaty, including

156

That is, if they face any taxation at all. See infra, section 2.
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157

consumption, excise, and trade taxes.
The reliance on trade and excise
taxes is historical, arising out of developed country practices that have since
been abandoned in developed countries in favor of personal income taxation
and, outside of the U.S., consumption taxation in the form of the value
added tax (VAT).158
Value added taxes are relatively new to LDCs, having been introduced
in the 1970s and 1980s, largely as a result of tax reforms initiated by
international monetary organizations as a condition of lending.159 Prior to
the introduction of the VAT, many LDCs, including those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, historically relied heavily on trade taxes for revenue following the
customs of the developed world that were introduced under colonization.160
The increased focus on the VAT was part of an overall effort to gradually
reduce and eventually allow complete elimination of taxes on international
trade.161

157

See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 4, at 452 (“we have noted a trend where developing
countries question the desirability of maintaining high source based taxation, but need to
find alternative sources of revenue… many of them rely to a lesser extent on OECD type
tax systems…instead, there is a greater reliance on value added taxes and asset taxes.”).
158
The shift from trade to income and consumption taxation in the U.S. and other
developed countries is discussed in WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS, supra note , at 14,
42, 44; William D. Samson, History of Taxation, in THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
SYSTEM 33–35 (Andrew Lymer & John Hasseldine, Eds., 2002).; and Reuven S. AviYonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000).
159
From 1950, when the VAT in its modern form emerged, until 1980, many countries
shifted from consumption taxes to payroll (social security) taxes, and since 1980 many
countries have begun to shift from personal income taxes to VAT. Ken Messare, Flip de
Kam & Christopher Heady, TAX POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN OECD COUNTRIES 28
(2003). See also Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform and Value-Added Tax: Indonesia, in WORLD
TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227 (Michael
Boskin & Charles E. McClure Jr., eds., 1990); Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 169.
160
Vito Tanzi, Taxation in Developing Countries, in TAX SYSTEMS IN NORTH
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 8-9 (Luigi Bernardi & Jeffrey Owens, eds., 1994)
(discussing revenue composition in LDCs). Trade taxes averaged about 27 percent of total
revenues from 1994 to 1999 in Sub-Saharan Africa largely, from 5 percent of revenues
collected in Angola to 49 percent in Uganda. Scott Riswold, IMF VAT Policy in SubSaharan Africa, 2003 WTD, Sep. 1, 2003. For a discussion of the impact of colonization
on tax systems in LDCs, see Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 145.
161
Such efforts have been encouraged by international monetary organizations such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as part of an overall tax reform
package introduced in various forms as a condition to ongoing lending arrangements.
Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 170.
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In Ghana, a 20% VAT was introduced in 1995 and quickly repealed in
the face of violent protests.162 After a lengthy educational campaign, the
government reinstated the VAT, this time at 10%, in 1998.163 Since then,
the VAT has not led to a decrease in any other taxes. A decrease in
international trade taxes (tariffs) and excise taxes was initially realized soon
after introduction of the VAT, but this trend has since reversed itself, and
these taxes are currently increasing as a percentage of total revenues
collected.164 Moreover, a temporary rise in corporate income taxation that
accompanied the introduction of the VAT appears to have leveled off, and
corporate tax rates are currently decreasing.165 As a result, the introduction
of VAT in Ghana has lead to an overall increase in taxes that are not
addressed by treaties.166
Finally, investors are likely to encounter non-comparable taxation in
Ghana as a result of government stake-holding in many formerly stateowned enterprises. For example, cocoa produced in Ghana is not subject to
income taxation,167 but is subject to levy by the Ghana Cocoa Board, a
monopsony for the international sale of Ghanaian cocoa products.168
Similarly, income taxation on Ghanaian mining activities approaches zero,
162

Ghana, Despite Its Successes, Is Swept by Anti-Tax Protests, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, May 23, 1995, sec. A, p. 6, col. 3 (describing VAT-related riot that led to 5 deaths).
163
Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax
Reform, 2004 BRITISH TAX REVIEW no. 2, 146, 155 (2004).
164
The remainder of Ghana’s tax revenue derives from excise taxes, mainly on
petroleum. Ernest Aryeetey, THE STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN 2002 26 (2003).
165
Id.
166
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption: Some International
Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1350 (1996) (theorizing the obsolescence of the
U.S. tax treaty network in the event the U.S. adopts a consumption tax and repeals the
income tax, since “[f]undamentally, income tax conventions apply to taxes on ‘income and
capital’”). There are some tax treaties that address consumption taxes, specifically valueadded taxes (VAT). However, in most countries, the VAT employed is destination-based,
meaning that exports are exempt from VAT and imports are subject to VAT. As a result,
double VAT is avoided to a certain extent without need for international agreement (some
double taxation will continue to occur to the extent there are varying definitions of
exempted and included items). The inconsistency occurs to various degrees in every
country that employs a VAT. However, developed countries continue to rely more heavily
than LDCs on income taxation, which is relieved by, and therefore necessitates the
continued existence of, tax treaties.
167
G.I.R.A § 11 (“income from cocoa of a cocoa farmer is exempt from tax”).
168
Acting as the intermediary between farmers and the global market, the Ghana
Cocoa Board has the “sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghana cocoa beans,”
and delivers only a fraction of realized proceeds to farmers, thus imposing a gross basis tax
that currently approximates some 33%.
See Ghana Cocoa Board Prices, at
http://www.cocobod.gh/GCBP_export_prices.cfm. See also Aryeetey, supra note 164.
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but the government extracts mining profits by owning shares in all mining
operations and requiring the payment of dividends on such shares.169 Thus a
focus on the VAT, income, international trade, and excise taxes in Ghana
provides only an incomplete picture of the full burden of taxation imposed
in this country. As treaties focus only on income taxation, they address
taxation in LDCs to a very limited degree.
2. Decreasing Global Tax Burdens
As non-comparable taxation increases, income taxation is decreasing
throughout the world. As a result, multinationals investing in LDCs may
face little or no income taxation on their foreign earnings. First, taxation
may be reduced or eliminated by residence countries pursuant to rules that
provide assets in offshore companies an indefinite suspension (“deferral”)
of residence-based taxation. Second, taxation may be reduced or eliminated
by source countries pursuant to tax incentives that eliminate taxation for a
specified duration or perpetually. Third, taxation by both countries may be
reduced or eliminated through strategies of tax avoidance and evasion.
Finally, taxation by both countries may be reduced or eliminated pursuant
to express efforts to do so by both taxing jurisdictions, usually through a tax
treaty. The combination of reduction or elimination of taxation in both
countries, whether express or not, leads to complete non-taxation170 of
multinational activities. As discussed more fully below, the resulting lack
of taxation obviates the need to pursue tax relief under treaty.
Reduced Taxation Through Deferral
As discussed above, most developed countries impose taxation on a
worldwide basis, yet most protect this right only with respect to certain
items of income, allowing suspension of taxation on other items to continue
indefinitely at the will of the shareholders.171 Thus, despite the support for
the primacy of residence-based taxation that originally served as a major
reason for entering into tax treaties,172 much residence-based taxation is
undermined by the persistent allowance of deferral.
Deferral is antithetical to residence-based taxation. By allowing it,
nominally residence-based jurisdictions like the U.S. mirror territorial
169

Aryeetey, supra note 164.
Sometimes called double non-taxation to indicate the coordinative effort that
produces it.
171
See supra, text at note 36.
172
See supra, text at note 68.
170
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systems by effectively providing tax exemption for foreign income.173
Deferral is defended on grounds of neutrality: it is argued that companies
from residence-based countries like the U.S. face heavier global tax burdens
than companies from territorial countries, when both operate in third
countries that impose little or no source-based taxation. For example, it is
suggested that U.S.-based multinational companies operating abroad may
be subject to little source-based taxation as foreign countries compete to
attract their investment by offering low tax burdens, but because of the U.S.
system of worldwide taxation, the U.S.-based company is still subject to the
higher U.S. domestic tax rates.
In contrast, it is supposed that
multinationals from territorial systems will have a tax advantage in the
minimally-taxing foreign country because these companies can combine
low taxation abroad with exemption at home.174
Based on this argument, deferral continues to be vigorously defended
under CIN principles, as requisite to allow U.S. companies to compete in
low-tax countries against the multinational companies of territorial
jurisdictions.175 That few multinational companies are actually residents of
173

See Peroni (1997), supra note 65. Passive income items such as dividends, interest,
and royalties, are generally not eligible for deferral and are therefore subject to current tax
in the U.S.
174
See Roin, supra note 63 at 114 (citing deferral proponents who argue that “[a]ny
businesses that Americans can successfully operate in low tax jurisdictions…foreign
investors can carry on equally well [and that if deferral was ended] foreign investors would
use their now unique tax advantage to overwhelm their American competitors, wherever
located”).
175
See, e.g., Mark Warren, Repealing the Deferral Rule: The Wrong Answer to U.S.
Job Losses (Republican Policy Committee, May 3, 2004), reprinted in 2004 WTD 88-16
(arguing that “some countries” exempt the foreign earnings of their multinationals, U.S.
companies would face a higher overall tax burden when operating in low-tax jurisdictions
in the absence of deferral, and that U.S. companies “cannot be expected to compete if they
are handicapped by a 35- percent corporate-tax rate on their worldwide income”); National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy
for the 21st Century-Part One: A Reconsideration of Subpart F, 1999 WTD 58-37 (Mar.
25, 1999), and related Statement of Fred F. Murray, Vice President for Tax Policy National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc. Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means
Hearing on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness June 30, 1999, at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/fullcomm/106cong/6-30-99/630murr.htm (arguing
that “if the local tax rate in the company of operation is less than the U.S. rate, …
competitors will be more lightly taxed than their U.S.-based competition,” whether they are
locally based or foreign, unless “their home countries impose a regime that is as broad as
subpart F, and none have to date done so”). The argument is perhaps as old as taxation
itself. In the newly independent United States, import duties were favored over export
duties or other forms of taxation, because the imposition of either export duties or property
taxes on farmers would equally increase the price of goods destined for export, thus serving
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176

territorial systems, and deferral provides the equivalent to exemption for
much of the foreign income earned by U.S. multinationals while
simultaneously providing them with a competitive advantage over their
domestic counterparts177 appears to have little effect on the efforts of U.S.
multinationals to preserve the deferral privilege.178
The effect of deferral is to increase the sensitivity of U.S. taxpayers to
foreign tax rates, thus forcing source countries to continually lower their
internal tax burdens so as to attract the ever more demanding foreign
capital. Deferral thus causes tax competition, as any income taxation
imposed by a source country such as Ghana subjects a potential foreign
investor to a burden it could otherwise avoid.179 Elimination of competition
and tax sensitivity could be achieved if all countries adhered to CEN.
However, this would require international coordination and cooperation to a
degree that appears overwhelmingly unattainable.180
to “enable others to undersell us abroad.” See COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES IN
CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, REPLY TO THE RHODE ISLAND OBJECTIONS, TOUCHING IMPORT
DUTIES, December 16, 1782 (reprinted in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 100-106 (Jonathon Elliot, ed., Lenox Hill Pub.,
1974) (1836).
176
For example, of the top 100 multinationals, 18 are from generally territorial systems
(one from Hong Kong, three from Switzerland, one from Malaysia, and 13 from France).
Since France imposes a form of world-wide taxation on low-taxed earnings of controlled
foreign companies, even this number is an exaggeration. Other countries may impose
worldwide income generally, but exempt the foreign income of their multinationals under
treaty. See The Top 100 TNCs, Ranked By Foreign Assets, 2000, supra note 81.
177
Domestic companies are subject to worldwide taxation, and cannot generally opt to
suspend the taxation of their profits. See generally, Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni &
Stephen E. Shay, An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, not
Expand, Deferral, 2000 WTD 20-13 (Jan. 31, 2000) (arguing that deferral is a subsidy for
operating business abroad and that proponents of deferral “have not candidly
acknowledged the broad nature of the scope of the existing deferral privilege”).
178
See supra, note 175.
179
Deferral removes the existing (residual) tax burden, thereby ensuring that any tax
imposed by a foreign country is a tax wedge. In the absence of deferral, the tax wedge is
created by the home country and, outside of limitations on foreign tax credits, taxes
imposed by the source country do not increase the wedge. For a discussion of the
interaction of deferral and the subsequent efforts of source countries to eliminate tax
wedges, see Dagan, supra note 41.
180
See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and A Multilateral Treaty, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641, 1681 (2001) (an internationally harmonized system is “too utopian
to merit discussion”), and Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Policies for the XXIst Century, in
VISIONS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS OF THE XXIST CENTURY (1996); but see Yariv Brauner, An
International Tax Regime In Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV 259 (2003) (arguing that there
has been a “modelization” of the international tax rules that could be built upon to achieve
some measure of rule harmonization). Recent developments in the EU indicate that less,
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The consequence is that U.S. multinationals may generally avoid U.S.
taxation on their foreign income by operating through subsidiary companies
in source countries,181 which they generally do.182 As suspension and
effective elimination of taxation on foreign income becomes the norm in the
developed world, LDCs respond accordingly, by increasingly offering
corresponding tax relief in the form of tax incentives. These incentives
have become a standard tool for capturing a share of the global flow of
foreign investment.183
Reduced Taxation Through Tax Incentives
Tax incentives of various forms are used by most countries to encourage
particular behavior in taxpayers, and neither the U.S. nor Ghana is an
exception. The U.S. employs numerous tax incentives to attract foreign
investment or encourage domestic investment. These provisions are
generally embedded in the tax base, rather than being reflected in the tax

rather than more, cooperation is likely. See Joann M. Weiner, EU Governments Fear
Increased Tax Competition in Wake of Accession, 2004 WTD 81-1 (Apr 6, 2004), and
European Commission Rejects Effort For Harmonized Corporate Tax Rates, DAILY TAX
REPORT G-8, June 1, 2004.
181
Shay (2004), supra note 202, at 31 (multinationals are free to choose to operate
through a branch or subsidiary, and they will generally choose subsidiary form unless the
foreign effective tax rate is greater than the U.S rate or if they benefit from pooling highand low-taxed earnings).
182
For example, several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are U.S. controlled
foreign corporations (CFCs), including the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd, Regimanuel
Gray, and Equatorial Bottlers, discussed supra at note 103. Operating through a domestic
subsidiary is also more advantageous from a Ghanaian perspective, since foreign
companies are subject to strict scrutiny from the taxing and regulatory authorities to an
extent exceeding that paid to domestic companies. The differential treatment is especially
acute in the case of mining and other extractive operations, which are strictly regulated and
limited as to foreign ownership by the Government of Ghana. Interview with Bernard
Ahafor, supra note 204. See also Shay (2004), supra note 202, at 31 (multinationals are
free to choose to operate through a branch or subsidiary, and they will generally choose
subsidiary form unless the foreign effective tax rate is greater than the U.S rate or if they
benefit from pooling high- and low-taxed earnings).
183
The evidence is perhaps most obvious in regards to the number of countries
offering tax holidays—over one hundred in 1998 and increasing—and the share of foreign
investment directed at tax havens that are decried by the OECD for their harmful tax
practices. While these countries command a fraction of the world’s population and its
GDP, they attract a disproportionately large amount of U.S. foreign investment capital. See
Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1577, 1589, and 1643.
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184

rate.
For example, along with the privilege of deferral, tax credits for
research and development (R&D) and accelerated depreciation deductions
are among the major tax incentives offered by the United States.185
Ghana also offers accelerated depreciation deductions and R&D credits
similar to—but perhaps not as generous as—those of the United States.186
184

Since the 1960s, an awareness of the danger of the hidden costs of such incentives
has led to expenditure budgeting, which quantifies the cost of embedded provisions. For an
example, see Analytical Perspectives (2004), supra note 65, explaining the concept of
expenditures and providing a selected list. Incentives currently embedded in the U.S. tax
base include accelerated depreciation and exclusions of certain forms of income such as
tax-exempt interest. Tax incentives include any exclusions or exemptions that reduce or
defer the tax base. See generally Alex Easson & Eric Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank
Course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries, April 28-May 1, 2003 at
3, at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/documents/taxpolicy/Zolt&Easson.pdf
(“tax incentives can take the form of tax holidays for a limited duration, current
deductibility for certain types of expenditures, or reduced import tariffs or customs”).
Ireland and Belgium, which offer low rates for foreign investors, are exceptions (and a
source of consternation to their OECD counterparts) to the general rule of tax base rather
than tax rate concessions in developed countries. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note
158, at 1601.
185
Congress first provided a deduction for research and experimental expenditures in
1981, because it saw a decline in research activities it attributed to inadequacies in the IRC
§ 174 deduction, which at that time only applied to investment in machinery and equipment
employed in research or experimental activities. Congress concluded that “in order to
reverse this decline in research spending … a substantial tax credit for incremental research
and experimental expenditures was needed.” JCS-71-81, General Explanation of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (H.R. 4242, 97th Congress, P.L. 97-34), GPO
December 31, 1981, at section C.
In the same act, Congress provided for accelerated
depreciation deduction allowances because the existing depreciation deduction allowances
“did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be essential for economic
expansion.” Id at Section A. Enhanced bonus depreciation provisions were enacted in
2001 under the theory that “allowing additional first-year depreciation will accelerate
purchases of equipment, promote capital investment, modernization, and growth, and will
help to spur an economic recovery,” HR. Rep. No. 107-251, House Ways and Means
Committee Report on Economic Security and Recovery Act of 2001, at Part II, Title I,
section A. Bonus depreciation was expanded in 2003 for the same reason. H.R. Rep. No.
108-94, House Ways and Means Committee Reports on P.L. 108-27 (Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003) at section 201. (“increasing and extending the additional
first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote capital investment,
modernization, and growth, … help to spur an economic recovery … [and] increase
employment opportunities in the years ahead). See also Richard E. Andersen, IRS Relaxes
Rules for Research Credit: Opportunities for R&D-Intensive Multinationals, 4 J. Taxn.
Global Trans. 17 (Spring, 2004) (discussing structures with which foreign and domestic
multinationals can use R&D credits to generate tax-free profits in the U.S., and citing a
2003 study by Bain & Co, entitled “Addressing the Innovation Divide,” in which it was
found that in the past decade, European drug makers placed their R&D in the United States
versus in local expansion by a two-to-one margin).
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However, most LDCs including Ghana also offer significantly more
generous incentives, in the form of low corporate tax rates and myriad tax
exemptions.187 Ghana imposes only an 8% tax on income from the export
of most goods, rates ranging from 16 to 25% for certain industries and
businesses carried out in certain geographic areas, and complete exemption
from taxation (tax holidays) for periods ranging from 3 to 10 years for new
activities conducted in certain industries or geographic areas.188 Many
LDCs, including Ghana, have also set aside geographic areas as havens
from the normal tax and regulatory regimes, specifically to host
manufacturing and processing plants (free zones). In Ghana’s free zone,
established in 1995, companies enjoy a ten year tax holiday followed by tax
rates never to exceed 8%.189
International organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF
currently decry the harm that tax holidays cause in depriving LDCs of
much-needed revenue.190 The elimination of income taxation on corporate
taxpayers, coupled with the pressure to reduce taxes on international trade,

187

For example, by 1998, over 100 countries had tax holidays. Avi-Yonah (2000),
supra note 158.
188
G.I.R.A. §11 (Industry Concessions) and First Schedule, Part II (Rates of Income
Tax Upon Companies). Although tax holidays are limited in duration, insufficient
enforcement prevents the IRS from curbing instances in which companies facing expiring
tax holidays simply dissolve and reincorporate under a different name to restart the clock.
Interview with Kweku Ackaah-Boafo, February 6, 2004 (Discussing a Canadian company
well known to have dissolved and reincorporated to avail itself of tax benefits).
189
G.I.R.A., First Schedule.
190
See, e.g., Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY
HANDBOOK 279, 283 (Parthasarathi Shome, ed. International Monetary Fund 1995) (stating
that tax incentives “have proved to be largely ineffective, while causing serious distortions
and inequities in corporate taxation”); Zmarak Shaliz, LESSONS OF TAX REFORM 60 (1991)
(“The use of so-called tax expenditures (tax preferences and exemptions to promote
specific economic and social objectives) should, in general, be deemphasized.”). This is a
reversal of position for the World Bank, which at one point encouraged LDCs to offer tax
incentives to attract foreign investment, and was concerned with the effect elimination of
tax incentives might have on its assistance projects. Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 169,
text at note 186; Shaliz (1991) at 68-69. The World Bank has since “recommended the
removal or tightening of incentives in Argentina (1989), Bangladesh (1989), Brazil (1989),
Ghana (1989), and Turkey (1987), among others.” Shaliz (1991) at 69. Tax incentives are
also contrary to WTO rules prohibiting tax subsidies. See WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Art. 1, para. 1.1. However, these provisions are rarely
enforced with respect to LDCs. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Martin B. Tittle, Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America: Overview and Current Status, Inter-American Development
Bank
(2002),
at
http://www.iadb.org/INT/Trade/1_english/2_WhatWeDo/1d_TaxDocuments.htm.
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has created critical revenue shortfalls in many countries.
Nevertheless,
new tax incentives continue to be introduced in both developed and less
developed countries around the world,192 often in response to private sector
lobbying.193 Some recent examples include the introduction of a new free
zone in the United Arab Emirates,194 a new five-year exemption period for
audit, accounting, and law firms in Singapore,195 and a new ten-year
corporate tax holiday for income from investments of at least €150 million
in Turkey.196
As a result of these kinds of initiatives, U.S. multinationals may face
little or no income taxation on income derived in LDCs. The impact of tax
treaties on activities giving rise to such income is therefore minimized, as
double taxation, and even single taxation, is avoided through unilateral tax
rules. However, even if home or source countries nominally impose
taxation on multinationals, widespread tax avoidance and evasion
neutralizes these taxes. Tax treaties appear to have little effect in these
circumstances.
Reduced Taxation Through Tax Avoidance and Evasion
In the event that deferral or tax incentives are not available,
multinational companies manage their worldwide tax exposure by using tax
planning techniques to shift income to low- or no-tax jurisdictions through
earnings stripping, transfer pricing, thin capitalization, and similar means of
tax avoidance and, in the extreme, tax evasion.197 For example, U.S.
191

Cordia Scott & Sirena J. Scales, Tax Competition Harms Developing Countries,
IMF official Says, 2003 WTD 238-9 (Dec. 10, 2003).
192
For example, see Kwang-Yeol Yoo, Corporate Taxation of Foreign Direct
Investment Income 1991-2001, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No.365, at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/48ae491b
8e2db4a9c1256d8e003b567f/$FILE/JT00148239.PDF.
193
For example, see David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Tech Companies in Brazil Seek
Tax Incentives to Promote R&D, 2004 WTD 138-6 (Jul. 19, 2004) (domestic and
multinational technology companies are currently lobbying for a three-year exemption
from federal taxes for income from sales of “all new products that contain significant
technological innovation”).
194
Under this new initiative, free-zone companies in Dubai will be exempt from
income and tax. See Cordia Scott, Dubai Woos Europe With Tax-Free Outsourcing Zone,
2004 WTD 118-12 (Jun. 17, 2004).
195
Lisa J. Bender, Singapore Launches Tax Incentives for Audit, Accounting, Law
Firms, 2004 WTD 66-5 (Apr. 5, 2004).
196
Mustafa Çamlica, Turkey Plans Tax Holidays for Large Investments, 2004 WTD
82-8 (Apr. 28, 2004).
197
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) (“transfer pricing
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multinationals typically use over- and under-invoicing to assign foreign
profits to subsidiaries in tax havens.198 As a result, firms can increasingly
make physical location decisions that are largely independent of tax-related
business decisions, shifting profits to the most advantageous tax
destination.199
Efforts by governments to curb such practices are
200
abundant but largely ineffective201 in the face of efforts by taxpayers to
engage in them.202
manipulation is one of the simplest ways to avoid taxation”); David Harris, Randall Morck,
Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 277, 301 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard &
Joel Slemrod eds., 1993), and James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of
Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401,
414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997). The line between tax avoidance and tax evasion is
murky. Tax avoidance generally refers to lawful attempts to minimize taxation, as Judge
Learned Hand famously noted in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850 (U.S. Circ.
Ct App, 2d Circ. 1947) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister
in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands…”). Tax evasion generally encompasses the unlawful and fraudulent avoidance
of tax accomplished by hiding taxable income and assets from taxing authorities.
198
See Council of the European Union, Final Draft Report of the Ad hoc Working
Party on Tax Fraud 4, 16 (Brussels, April 27 2000) (direct tax fraud is typically committed
through false invoicing, under-and over-invoicing, non-declaration of income earned in
foreign jurisdictions, and “use by taxpayers of a fictitious tax domicile, with the purpose to
evade fulfilling their tax obligations in their country of domicile for tax purposes”); see
also Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Move More Profits to Tax Havens, 2004 WTD
31-4 (Feb. 9, 2004) (although they comprise just 13% of productive capacity and 9% of
employment, subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals located in the top 11 tax havens were
assigned 46.3% of foreign profits in 2001), and Hooke, supra note 119, at 86 (suggesting
that to control costs, it is “sound operating procedure” for a foreign investor of an export
platform in a LDC to interpose an offshore bank, and overcharge the foreign company for
imported supplies and management fees to reduce income in the source country.).
199
See Christoph Spengel & Anne Schäfer, International Tax Planning in the Age of
ICT, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-27 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=552061 (arguing
that information and commercial technology makes geographic distances “less relevant”
and allows companies to choose location and form of investment on the basis of
international tax differentials).
200
Transfer pricing rules are a common feature in the tax systems of most countries, as
are rules denying deductions for interest and royalties in certain cases and, often, rules
requiring a certain combination of debt and equity (thin capitalization rules).
201
In the U.S., the transfer pricing rules are long and complicated and constantly
evolving, but still considered inadequate in preventing profit-shifting, as are U.S. earningsand interest-stripping rules (see IRC § 163(j); these are essentially thin capitalization rules),
each of which are similarly limited in their success in curbing avoidance of U.S. taxation.
For an overview of U.S. efforts to control transfer pricing, see Avi-Yonah (1995), supra
note 197. For a recent example of the failure of interest stripping rules, consider the
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In LDCs such as Ghana, where enforcement of the tax law has been
relatively less of a focus than reform of the tax law, tax authorities are all
but helpless against these practices.203 It is popularly said that Ghanaian
companies keep three sets of books: one for the banks, showing large profits
so as to secure financing; one for the Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), showing large losses so as to avoid paying taxes; and one set, very
closely-guarded by the owners, that contains the most accurate
information.204 There is no official data available regarding whether, and to
what extent, U.S. multinationals take advantage of enforcement
weaknesses.205 Ghana recently introduced a Large Taxpayers Unit to curtail
tax evasion, but the Ghanaian IRS relies on the good faith of company
officials and their independent auditors because the resources are lacking to
perform audits on all but a few companies.206 Given that the overall tax
growing use of Canadian Income Funds to avoid the application of IRC § 163(j). See, e.g.,
Jack Bernstein & Barbara Worndl, Canadian-U.S. Cross-Border Income Trusts: New
Variations, 34 TAX NOTES INT'L 3-281 (April 19, 2004).
202
See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 3-29, 36
(March, 2004) (“The drive on the part of taxpayers, multinational and others, to push down
effective tax rates has accelerated in recent years.”).
203
See Stewart (2003), supra note 4.
204
Interviews with Margaret K. Insaidoo, Justice of the High Court of Ghana,
Tuesday, Dec. 9, 2003; Bernard Ahafor (Attorney, Private Practice), Tuesday, Dec. 2,
2003; and Sefah Ayebeng (Chief Inspector of Taxes, Internal Revenue Service), Thursday,
Dec. 11, 2003. Notes on file with the author. The implication is that firms keep separate
books in an attempt to defraud the government, rather than in the ordinary course of
keeping separate tax and cost accounting books, for which there is generally no statutory
proscription. See, e.g., Charles E. Hyde & Chongwoo Choe, Keeping Two Sets of Books:
The Relationship Between Tax & Incentive Transfer Prices (February 14, 2004), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=522623 (arguing that keeping two sets of books with respect to
transfer pricing is “not only legal but also typically desirable” for many MNEs).
205
Anecdotal evidence that multinationals are thought to evade taxation where
possible is not lacking, however. See, e.g., Sirena J. Scales, Venezuela Temporarily Closes
McDonald's Nationwide, 2005 WTD 26-11 (Feb. 9, 2005) (“Venezuela's Tax Agency
(SENIAT) has temporarily closed all 80 McDonald's restaurants in the nation, citing failure
to comply with tax rules…..”)
206
Seth E. Terkper, Ghana Establishes Long-Awaited Large Taxpayer Unit, 2004
WTD 64-10 (Apr. 2, 2004). A mid-size taxpayers unit is also in the planning stages.
Interview with Sefah Ayebeng, supra note 204. A more effective audit process may not be
sufficient to induce increased compliance, however. A recent empirical study about
Australian investors that were accused of engaging in abusive tax transactions argues that
taxpayers’ level of trust regarding the fairness, neutrality, and respect accorded to them by
the revenue authorities was correlated to their level of voluntary compliance, and that
although trust alone should not be relied upon in enforcing a tax system, “a regulatory
strategy that combines a preference for trust with an ability to switch to a policy of distrust
is therefore likely to be the most effective.” Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in
Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 Law and Human Behavior, 2-
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compliance rate is estimated to be less than 20% in Ghana, good faith
appears to be rather elusive.207
As a consequence of tax avoidance and evasion strategies, income is
often exempt from taxation even if it nominally applies in the residence
country, the source country, or both. In such a taxing environment, there is
little taxation, let alone double taxation, to be relieved by treaty.
Governments are not unaware of the problem. Tax avoidance and evasion
has typically been addressed in treaties through information sharing
provisions, in which the respective taxing jurisdictions agree to assist each
other in collecting revenues.208 These provisions have a perhaps unintended
consequence, however. Introduction of a tax treaty may decrease
investment, as investors seek to avoid the implementation of the
information sharing provisions that have become standard in tax
agreements.209
The intersection of the taxation of portfolio interest and U.S. interest
reporting rules provides an illustration of this tension. The United States is
187 (April, 2004). In an interesting twist, South Korea recently announced that domestic
and foreign companies meeting target job creation goals will be free from audits in 2004
and 2005 under a new tax incentive program. James Lim, South Korea offering Companies
That Create Jobs Shield From Audits, 34 DAILY TAX REPORT G-3 (February 23, 2004).
207
The compliance rate is an estimate of Ghanaian IRS officials and not an official
government statistic. Interviews with Sefah Ayebeng, supra note 204 (estimating
compliance at 20%) and Fred Ajyarkwa (official, Internal Revenue Service) (estimating it
at 17%).
208
The US Model requires contracting states to exchange all relevant information to
carry out the provisions of the tax treaty or the domestic laws of the states concerning taxes
covered by the treaty, including assessment, collection, enforcement, and prosecution
regarding taxes covered by the convention. See Art. 26, para. 1. It also calls for treaty
override of domestic bank secrecy or privacy laws. The OECD Model does not include the
assessment/collection language but extends the scope of taxes to “every kind and
description imposed on behalf of the contracting states.” See Art. 26, para 1. It does not
include an equivalent to the US Model’s secrecy law override. The UN Model limits
assistance to taxes covered by the Convention as in the US Model, and explicitly adds that
information exchange is intended to prevent fraud or evasion of taxes. See Art. 26, para 1.
209
Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on
U.S. FDI Activity, NBER Working Paper No. w8834 (March 2002), at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8834 (showing a decrease in foreign investment upon the
introduction of a tax treaty and suggesting that such decrease may be the result of the
dampening effect tax treaties may have on tax evasion due to information sharing
provisions); Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct
Investment, University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-14 (June 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=436502 (“treaties have
either a zero or even a negative effect on FDI” because they dampen the ability of
businesses to engage in tax evasion activities, especially through transfer pricing).
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a potential tax haven for foreign investors because of its zero tax on
portfolio interest and rules under which banks are generally not required to
report interest payments made to nonresident aliens.210 Efforts to require
interest payment reporting have consistently met strong resistance by the
private sector, which argues that such rules would “hinder tax competition
between nations,” “undermine the global shift to lower tax rates and
fundamental tax reform,” and “help oppressive governments track down
flight capital.”211 Several members of Congress echo these sentiments,
arguing that expanded reporting rules “would likely result in the flight of
hundreds of billions of dollars from U.S. financial institutions” and could
cause “serious, irreparable harm to the U.S. economy.”212 The implication
is that while the U.S. does not condone tax evasion, there has emerged no
political will strong enough to counter the private interests benefiting from
the rules as they currently exist.213
Similar sentiments may exist in the context of tax treaties, especially
when the partner country, as in the case of Ghana, has a very limited ability
to enforce the tax laws prior to the introduction of a treaty. If foreign
investors are able to avoid taxation in Ghana, for instance through
aggressive tax planning, a tax treaty that requires or permits Ghana to
provide tax information to the U.S. taxing authority may not be welcome.214
Reduced Taxation Through Coordination (“Tax Sparing”)
210

IRC §§ 871(h) and 882(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5. Canadian residents are a current
to the interest reporting rules, and proposed regulations would extend the reporting
requirements to include all interest over $10 paid to any non-resident alien individual.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-8(a).
211
Free Market Interest Groups Urge Treasury to Withdraw Alien Interest Reporting
Rules, 16 DAILY TAX REPORT G-2 (January 27, 2004).
212
House Lawmakers Ask Bush to Withdraw IRS Interest Reporting Rules for Aliens,
69 DAILY TAX REPORT G-8 (April 10, 2002); See also Sen. Gordon Smith, Letter on
Proposed Nonresident Alien Interest Reporting Rules (REG-133254-02) to Treasury
Secretary John Snow, reprinted in the DAILY TAX REPORT, February 20, 2003 (urging
Treasury not to move forward with interest reporting rules because it “would drive the
savings of foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank accounts in
other nations,” and expressing the Senator’s failure to understand “why we put the
enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a priority at Treasury.”)
213
Perhaps recent efforts to create a multinational task force to combat abusive taxavoidance can provide the pressure needed to reform this long standing impasse. See
Sirena J. Scales, Multination Task Force Created to Combat Abusive Tax Avoidance, 2004
TNT 81-4 (April 26, 2004).
214
Moreover, to the extent that a U.S. tax treaty coordinates transfer pricing rules, a
treaty might increase the taxation of a multinational that could otherwise benefit from
conflicting domestic standards. See Statement of Leslie B. Samuels, supra note 5.
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The proliferation of tax incentives and tax holidays in LDCs coupled
with deferral in the U.S. and opportunities for tax avoidance in both
countries limits the need for tax treaties to relieve double taxation. Since
the 1950s, tax sparing has been promoted as a way to use tax treaties to
increase investment to targeted LDCs, even in the absence of double
taxation.215 Tax sparing prevents residence-country taxation of income
exempted from tax by source countries,216 by providing that if a source
country refrains from taxing income derived in its jurisdiction (usually
pursuant to a tax holiday), the residence country nevertheless grants a tax
credit for the tax nominally imposed.217
Thus, under tax sparing, two taxing jurisdictions cooperate to exempt
multinational companies from income taxation in both countries. Although
similar effects could be accomplished unilaterally by residence countries,218
tax sparing is generally seen as a mechanism that should be offered in the
context of a tax treaty, as a measure to encourage foreign investment to
selected LDCs.219 Tax sparing has particularly been promoted as a vehicle
for investment and aid to the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.220
215

See generally OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998). Recent
literature includes Brown, supra note 7; and Damien Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax
Sparing Policy with Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International
Norms, 20 VA. TAX REV. 467 (2000) (arguing that LDCs “need tax holidays to attract
foreign investment,” and therefore tax sparing is requisite to counter the effect of residual
home country taxation under tax treaties). Tax sparing is also defended as justifiable on
grounds of capital import neutrality, on the basis that it allows American multinationals to
compete with companies from other exemption-providing countries in the global
marketplace. See infra discussion at note 218. However, tax sparing violates the concept
of capital export neutrality, and has been consistently rejected by the Treasury Department
on the grounds that tax treaties are supposed to relieve double taxation, not eliminate
taxation altogether, and that tax treaties are not meant to provide benefits to U.S. persons.
216
Tax sparing was first introduced in the U.K. by the British Royal Commission,
which prepared a report in 1953 recommending tax sparing as a means of “aiding British
investment abroad.” Rejected by the U.K. in 1957 after several years of debate, tax
sparing was enabled in U.K. tax treaties as a result of legislative action in 1961. The
purpose of the legislation was “enabling the U.K. to give relief to developing countries for
taxes spared under foreign incentive programs.” TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION,
supra note 215, at 15.
217
Many examples and explanations of tax sparing exist. For an overview of tax
sparing, see Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy with Respect to LDCs, 32 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 262 (1963). (1963).
218
For example, the U.S. could expand the definition of a creditable tax to include
certain nominally-imposed taxes. See, e.g., McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 268-269.
219
For example, see proposals suggested by Brown, supra note 7, and Laurey, supra
note 215, regarding the use of tax treaties to implement foreign aid initiatives by
encouraging foreign investment through tax sparing. See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,
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However, there is little evidence that tax sparing increases foreign
investment.221 In Ghana’s case, tax sparing provisions in its treaties with
the U.K.222 and France223 have produced no significant increase in foreign
investment from these countries.224 On the contrary, tax sparing could
potentially decrease investment in LDCs, since it enables foreign investors
to repatriate earnings that they would otherwise leave abroad under the
protection of deferral.225 As such, tax sparing appears fundamentally
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay
Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 347 (2001) (suggesting that
limiting tax sparing to its use in tax treaties “would allow appropriate distinctions to be
made among nations and would assist the United States in negotiating appropriate
reciprocal tax concessions for its residents”).
220
Brown, supra note 7 (arguing for tax sparing in tax treaties specifically with SubSaharan Africa).
221
For an overview of the conflicting economic literature regarding the interaction of
tax sparing and FDI, see McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 284.
222
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income and Capital Gains, 1993, Ghana-U.K., art. 25,
para 4, S.I. 1993 No. 1800 (U.K. grants tax credits for Ghanaian tax paid including “any
amount which would have been payable as Ghana tax for any year but for an exemption or
reduction of tax granted for that year or any part thereof”); Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes On
Income and Capital Gains, Nov. 29, 1977, Ghana-U.K., art. 21, para. 2, 1162 U.N.T.S. 341
(same).
223
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income and On Capital Gains, Dec 4., 1992, Fr.-Ghana,
art. 24, para 3, 94 TNI 74-25 (France grants tax credits for Ghanaian tax paid including
“any amount which would have been payable as Ghana tax for any year but for an
exemption or reduction of tax granted for that year”).
224
See B. R. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL STATISTICS, AFRICA, ASIA &
OCEANIA, 1750-1988, at 499, 550-552 (1992); KWODWO EWUSI, STATISTICAL TABLES ON
THE ECONOMY OF GHANA, 1950-1985 (Dec. 1986), at Table 155; and AGBODEKA, supra
note 119.
225
See, e.g., Peroni, Fleming & Shay (1999), supra note 67, at 469 (deferral
encourages “[r]etention and reinvestment of earnings by foreign companies”); see also
Laurey, supra note 215, at 484 (tax sparing would “allow U.S. multinationals to repatriate
earnings based on business needs instead of on adverse tax consequences”). In a 2002
study of the annual filings of the companies in the S&P 500, it was found that such
companies had accumulated over $500 billion in un-repatriated foreign earnings. Anne
Swope, Bruce Kasman & Robert Mellman, Bringing It All Back Home: Repatriation
Legislation’s Final Lap (JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2004), at www.morganmarkets.com).
This figure represents a trend of ever-increasing “trapped” foreign profits. Conversely, by
acting as an incentive to repatriate capital, tax sparing may be advantageous to the U.S.
economy even though it has long been rejected for policy reasons. For example, in the
context of the repeal of ETI, legislators proposed the enactment of a reduced rate of tax on
repatriated profits, citing in support the need to direct capital back to the U.S in the quest to
create jobs and boost the economy.
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inconsistent with the goal of using tax treaties to increase investment flows
from developed to less developed countries.
Moreover, tax sparing increases tax competition by creating an
additional disadvantage for countries that do not have tax holidays, while
leaving countries that have a tax holiday in effect in the same or worse
position as they were when only deferral was available.226 The OECD has
initiated efforts to combat what it terms “harmful tax practices”—in
essence, any tax regime that undermines residence-based taxation by
providing tax breaks and refusing to cooperate in information sharing.227
Persisting in the allowance of deferral and tax holidays and promotion of
tax sparing seem equally inconsistent with the treaty-related goal of
protecting residence-based tax bases.
Foreseeing the surge in lobbying by U.S. multinationals upon the
ratification of any treaty with tax sparing, the U.S. has been unequivocal in
its rejection of these provisions.228 While the potentially negative impact on
investment in LDCs is one valid reason why tax sparing should continue to
be rejected, the primary position of the U.S. has been that tax sparing
inappropriately allows the reduction of U.S. taxation of U.S. persons, a
result specifically precluded by all U.S. treaties currently in force.229
Some LDCs, notably those in Latin America, have terminated tax treaty
negotiations with the U.S. over the issue of tax sparing.230 However, the
U.S. position on tax sparing is only “one of several obstacles in the way of
U.S.-developing country tax treaties.”231 In fact, tax sparing is largely
unnecessary in the quest for complete non-taxation. As discussed above,
tax holidays granted by LDCs to investors from deferral-granting countries

226

See, e.g., Margalioth (2003), supra note 81 at 198.
See generally STAFF OF THE OECD FISCAL AFFAIRS COMM., THE OECD'S PROJECT
ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004).
228
Tax sparing was contemplated but ultimately rejected in tax treaties with Egypt,
India, and Israel, largely due to the efforts of Stanley Surrey, who argued vigorously
against the provision.
See Laurey, supra note 215 (citing TAX SPARING: A
RECONSIDERATION, supra note215, at 15-17). Tax sparing was also introduced in a tax
treaty with Pakistan, but a subsequent change in Pakistan law rendered the provision
obsolete and the treaty entered into force without it.
229
This rule is enforced under the “saving clause” found in all U.S. tax treaties. See
the US Model, art. 1, para. 4.
230
Laurey, supra note 215, at 471, 493 (many LDCs have “refused to sign U.S. tax
treaties that do not contain tax sparing clauses,” especially those in Latin America because
this region “resents the U.S. [residence-based] tax policy”).
231
McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 292.
227

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20

2005]

Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid

53

such as the U.S. are effective so long as capital is reinvested rather than
repatriated.232
3. Domestic Tax Rates Equal to or Better Than Treaty Rates
In treaties between developed countries, domestic tax regimes are often
significantly different than treaty-based tax regimes.233 This is especially
the case with respect to tax rates on passive income paid to foreign persons,
which are typically much higher under domestic statutes than under tax
treaties.234 However, LDCs increasingly impose tax rates that are much
closer to, and in some cases are less than, the typical rates provided in
treaties.
For example, dividends paid to foreign shareholders would normally be
subject to a 10% tax in Ghana, unless the company paying the dividend
operates in a free zone, in which case the tax rate may be zero.235 Thus
Ghana’s statutory tax rate is the same as or less than what would be
expected under the hypothetical Ghana-U.S. treaty outlined above. In
addition, Ghana’s internal rate is lower than the 15% maximum provided in
the US Model for regular dividends.236 Nevertheless, it is higher with
respect to direct dividends than the maximum 5% provided in the US Model
and the zero rate for dividends paid to foreign controlling company
shareholders found in new treaties.
Because most dividends paid out of Ghana would likely constitute direct
dividends, many of which would be paid to controlling shareholders,237 a
treaty rate that followed the US Model or recent U.S. treaty practice would
reduce taxation on U.S. investors in Ghana from the internal rate of 10% (or
zero)238 to 5% or zero. However, as discussed above, if U.S. tax treaty
precedent is followed, it is unlikely that a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty would
232

Tillinghast (1996), supra note 62, at 478.
Some countries have incorporated treaty concepts into their domestic laws. For
example, the U.K. and Italy have adopted permanent establishment thresholds for the
taxation of business profits based on the OECD Model. However, these examples are rare.
234
OECD Model rates do not exceed 15% for dividends, 10% for interest, and 0 for
royalties. OECD Model, Art. 10, 11, and 12. In contrast, maximum statutory tax rates in
OECD countries average 18, 14, and 16% on dividends, interest, and royalties,
respectively. See generally, Ernst & Young, supra note 36.
235
Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most dividends, but provides tax incentives,
including exemptions of taxation on passive income paid by domestic companies to foreign
investors, as described above. See G.I.R.A. §§ 2 and see infra, text at notes 184 to 196.
236
US Model, art. 10.
237
See infra, text at note 182.
238
The rate depends on whether the payment derives from sources protected by a free
zone or tax holiday regime.
233

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

54

[Vol. 154:XX

provide for these lower rates. In fact, if a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty provided
for regular dividend taxation lower than 10%, direct dividend taxation at
5%, and no source country taxation of interest and royalties pursuant to the
US Model, it would be the first and only U.S. tax treaty to do so with any
country, developed or less developed.239
If the U.S. provided as concession to Ghana that instead of a maximum
5% rate for direct dividends, the maximum source-country rate would be
10%, the result would only be that Ghana’s statutory 10% rate would be
maintained.240 No benefit in the form of reduced taxation would be realized
under this agreement. In fact, if the recently concluded Sri-Lanka-U.S.
treaty serves as a model, a Ghana-U.S. treaty could even provide for
maximum rates that are higher than Ghana’s internal rates, though again
this could hardly benefit current or potential investors.241
Similarly, Ghana’s statutory rates of 5-10% on interest and 15% on
rents and royalties242 comport with the average respective rates offered
under other U.S. treaties, although the US Model contemplates zero source
taxation of both.243 Just as in the case of direct dividends, preserving a
239

The closest rates to these are found in the treaty with Russia, which provides for
source country tax rates of 10% on regular dividends, 5% on direct dividends, and zero on
interest and royalties. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Jun. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Russ., TIAS. To compare the rates in other treaties, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
U.S. TAX TREATIES 33 (Internal Revenue Service Pub. 901, Rev. May, 2004) (note that
although updated in May, 2004, this document has no information regarding the U.S. tax
treaty with Sri Lanka (signed , entered into force Jun. 13, 2004).
240
The treaty with Ghana would be one of six U.S. treaties with a top 10% rate for
dividends. See U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 239 at 33, 34 (providing 10% as the
maximum tax rate on dividends in U.S. tax treaties with China, Japan, Mexico, Romania,
and Russia)
241
In the treaty with Sri-Lanka, the Joint Committee queries whether this is intended,
and supposes that Sri Lanka could raise its rates up the maximum 15% provided, thereby
increasing its revenues from foreign investment. Yet in the same document, the Committee
proclaims that the treaty will be good for the U.S. because it reduces Sri Lankan tax on
U.S. investors and provides a clearer framework. These two positions appear difficult to
reconcile, as the Joint Committee appears to recognize. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX.,
EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 130, at 62.
242
Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most interest payments, and a 15% tax on
rents and royalties, with alternate rates ranging from 5 to 15% for certain payments,
depending on the residence of the recipient and the payor. G.I.R.A. §§ 2, 84, and the First
Schedule, Parts IV through VIII.
243
With respect to interest, see US Model, art. 11. Thirty-one existing U.S. treaties,
including several of the most recently signed treaties and protocols, reflect this goal. See,
e.g., Japan-U.S. Treaty, art 11; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, art. 11; and Australia Protocol, art. 7.
Interest tax rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties. With respect to royalties,
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higher rate of tax would be likely under UN Model standards, but would
generally be a neutral factor for investors.
Concessions that allow for higher source country taxation of passive
income items reflect the concerns addressed by the UN Model regarding the
worldwide allocation of tax revenues, and are meant to protect the taxing
jurisdiction of capital importing nations like Ghana against the effects of the
US and OECD Model treaties, which allocate income away from source and
towards residence countries.244 However, as the case of Ghana illustrates,
preserving higher source country taxation is a neutral measure at best, and it
is contradictory to the notion otherwise promoted by U.S. policy makers
that reducing tax rates will reduce tax barriers to direct investment and
thereby increase capital flows between countries.
To date, there is no consensus regarding the appropriate balance of
attracting investment through lower tax rates and preserving the allocation
of revenue to source countries.245 Preserving source country revenues has
been prioritized on the grounds that low taxation has a deleterious effect on
infrastructure. In LDCs, providing adequate infrastructure to attract
multinationals has been a continuous challenge that is further complicated
by tax competition, a phenomenon not alleviated by tax treaties.
4. Inadequate Infrastructure and Non-Tax Barriers
U.S. investors may be significantly influenced in their investment
location decisions by broad infrastructure-related criteria such as the rule of
law and the protection of property, as well as the immediate need for a
suitable workforce and adequate physical infrastructure.246 The need for a
suitable workforce in turn necessitates basic infrastructure including social
structures such as schools and health care systems. In direct tension with
these needs is the diminishing ability of LDCs to finance infrastructural
development as they decrease taxes on business profits.
Many countries, including Ghana, offer tax incentives such as tax
holidays and tax-free zones because attracting investment to sustain
see US Model, art. 12. Twenty-six existing U.S. treaties, including several of the most
recently signed treaties and protocols, provide zero source country tax on most royalties.
See, e.g., Japan-U.S. Treaty, art 12 and U.S.-U.K. Treaty, art. 12. As in the case of interest,
royalty tax rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties.
244
See Dagan, supra note 41.
245
The lack of consensus is illustrated by the omission of standard rates in the UN
Model, Art. 10, 11, and 12.
246
Hooke, supra note 119, at 47, 49. A recent study found that the higher the average
years of schooling of a source country’s workforce, the more foreign investment tends to
flow into such country.
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economic development is deemed of greater importance than protecting tax
revenues.247 However, there is little consensus regarding the effectiveness
of tax incentives and tax holidays in actually attracting foreign investment.
Anecdotal evidence from various countries suggests that providing tax
incentives to attract foreign investment has failed to deliver the promised
benefits.248 Despite a plethora of tax holidays and other tax incentives, few
permanent employment opportunities have been created and exports have
failed to increase in the many free zones located throughout West Africa,
including Ghana.249 According to John Atta-Mills, former Commissioner of
the Ghanaian IRS, “experience shows that tax holidays and tax reductions
are ranked very low in the priority of investors in their choice of location
for their business,” and that product demand, a skilled workforce, and
infrastructure are more important to businesses.250
Economic evidence regarding the connection between taxation and
foreign investment provides little additional certainty. A number of
economic studies indicate that multinationals are very sensitive to tax
considerations, and therefore corporate location decisions may be heavily
influenced by tax regimes in source countries.251 However, conflicting
studies indicate that taxation is not a significant factor in the location
decisions of U.S. multinationals.252 Instead, these studies argue that
247

Brian Arnold, General Report 25, 28 in IFA REPORT ON TAX COMPETITION (IFA
2001) (stating that “certain countries…are more concerned with attracting activity and
investment of the multinationals in order to sustain their economic development”).
248
See, e.g., Tamas Revesz, EU, Companies Urge Reform of Hungary's Local Industry
Tax, 2004 WTD 97-10 (2004) (Although Slovakia offered big investment subsidies and tax
relief for foreign investors, its budget is in ruins, and the resulting forced cuts in
government spending (especially transfers to households) have triggered serious hunger
riots among the most seriously hit Roma population.)
249
Papa Demba Thiam, Market Access and Trade Development: Key Actors 97, 101,
in TOWARDS A BETTER REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA (John
Igue & Sunhilt Schumacher, eds., 1999). See also text at note 112 (trade data indicates
imports from Ghana to the U.S. are currently declining).
250
Seth E. Terkper, Tax Measures in Ghana's 2004 Budget Inadequate, Opposition
Party's Presidential Candidate Says, 2004 WTD 63-12 (April 1, 2004).
251
For an overview of this economic literature, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158,
at 1590-1592; James R. Hines Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational
Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401-445 (Alan J.
Auerbach, ed., 1997); and James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to
International Taxation, NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, June 1999, 52 (2), 305-322.
252
See Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in
Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 G. 35 G. W. INTL. L. REV. 265, 280 (2003)
(providing an overview of some of this literature); see also G. Peter Wilson, The Role of
Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions, in Giovanni, Hubbard & Slemrod (1993), supra
note 197 (arguing that taxes are more influential in location decisions for administrative
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“market size, labor cost, infrastructure quality…and stable international
relations,” among other considerations, are the most important factors for
location decisions.253 Studies focused particularly on foreign investment in
Sub-Saharan Africa come to the same conclusion.254
In contrast, recent literature suggests that past studies present an
incomplete picture of the role of taxation because they have focused on
source country corporate income taxes, the burdens of which are relatively
insignificant as compared to the burdens of non-income taxation in source
countries.255 As a result, these past studies may have obscured the more
significant influence of non-income taxation on foreign investment
decisions.256 Since foreign non-income tax burdens significantly exceed
income tax burdens, these taxes may strongly influence the behavior of U.S.
multinationals.257 The main explanation given for this influence is that nonincome taxation is not creditable against U.S. residual taxation.258
The findings of this literature are consistent with earlier studies that
suggest the relative importance of taxation in a particular country may be
increasing with the availability of opportunities for avoiding taxation

and distribution centers, but they “inhere in but rarely dominate the decision process” in the
case of production locations).
253
Id.
254
See, e.g., World Bank, WORLD BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY 2000 (finding as a
result of a survey of business including Ghana and 15 other Sub-Saharan African countries
that firms investing in these regions indicate less sensitivity to taxation than to corruption,
infrastructure, crime, inflation, financing, and political stability); Elizabeth Asiedu, On the
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?
(July 2001), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=280062 (arguing that location-specific factors such
as natural resource availability may make infrastructure and stability of particular
importance in the context of investment to Sub-Saharan Africa).
255
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign Direct Investment in a
World of Multiple Taxes, xx J. PUB. ECON. xxx (2004)) (“foreign indirect tax obligations of
American multinational firms are more than one and a half times their direct tax
obligation”). In previous studies, James Hines found a “small but significant” link between
lower source country taxes and foreign investment levels, as discussed in both McDaniel
(2003), supra note 252 at 281, and Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1644.
256
Desai & Hines (2004), supra note 255, at 34.
257
Id.
258
Id. (“Since American taxpayers can claim tax credits for income taxes paid to
foreign governments, but are unable to claim similar tax credits for indirect taxes paid to
foreign governments, it follows that foreign indirect taxes have much greater potential to
influence their behavior”). For an argument that the definition of creditable taxes should
be broadened to encompass many non-income taxes, see Glenn E. Coven, International
Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83
(1999).
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elsewhere.259 However, these findings conflict with other studies that show
multinationals can use debt financing and transfer pricing manipulation to
achieve tax neutrality in investment location decisions,260 and that
demonstrate, despite earlier studies showing a connection between tax and
foreign direct investment, that non-tax factors dominate the location
decisions of multinational firms.261
Given the possibility that taxation may not be an overriding factor in
foreign investment location decisions, the influence of infrastructure cannot
be ignored. To the extent infrastructure is important to potential investors,
efforts to reduce taxation to attract foreign investment may be
counterproductive, since raising sufficient revenues is integral to the level
of infrastructure a country can offer. 262 As tax competition ensures less
taxation of multinationals, the ability of LDCs to fund sufficient
infrastructure to attract and sustain foreign investment relies more heavily
on the ability to tax resident individuals, whether directly or indirectly.
Historically, this has been a great challenge for LDCs.263

259

See Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, supra note 67 at 9, 22, 28 (suggesting that tax
rates are extremely important to U.S. multinationals in allocating their foreign direct
investment, especially in the case of manufacturing, and that the relative importance of
taxes may be increasing)
260
Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1315, Gary C. Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of
International Income: Blueprint for Reform 134 (1992) (suggesting that a multinational
company can unilaterally achieve CEN “because it can make its investment decision
without regard to the combined rates of tax”).
261
Haroldene Wunder, The Effect of International Tax Policy on Business Location
Decisions, TAX NOTES INT'L 1332 (Dec. 24, 2001) (updating the Grubert & Mutti 2000
study).
262
See Kaldor (1963), supra note 263 (stating that “the importance of public revenue
to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their
hopes of accelerated economic progress”). See also David Rosenbloom, Response to “U.S.
Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: Administration
and Tax Treaty Issues,” 35 G. W. INTL. L. REV. 401, 406 (2003) (stating that “taxes are, by
definition, involuntary exactions”). Thailand has recently taken a slightly different
approach. In June, 2004, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Education, and the Social and
Human Development Services Ministry unveiled tax incentives for individuals and
companies that make charitable donations to social development programs including
education, museums, libraries, art galleries, recreational facilities, children's playgrounds,
public parks, and sports arenas. The government hopes that “these incentives will raise
funds from the private sector to alleviate the poverty crisis in Thailand.” Sirena J. Scales,
Thai Government Announces Tax Incentives for Charitable Contributions, 2004 WTD 12910 (Jul. 6, 2004).
263
Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax? 41 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 410 (1963).

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20

2005]

Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid

59

Compliance rates for income and non-income taxation are typically very
low in Ghana. It is estimated that 80% of business is conducted on the
informal market—that is, not subject to regulation or taxation because it is
conducted in the form of cash or barter.264 Thus, only those who work for
the government or for the few companies that comply with wage
withholding obligations pay their income taxes.265 An appearance that the
laws are not applied uniformly may in turn lead to increased tax avoidance
and evasion.266
The situation is exasperated when corruption or
mismanagement of public funds also exists. While Ghana’s corruption
factor is relatively modest in comparison to many of its neighbors in SubSaharan Africa,267 the notion persists that wealth can be achieved by
becoming a government official.268 These perceptions plague the revenue
collection efforts of tax agencies in LDCs such as Ghana.269
264

The agricultural industry is thought to contribute significantly to this number, since
over 60% of Ghana’s population is employed in agriculture (a slightly lower percentage
than the average of approximately 70% in Sub-Saharan Africa). WORLD FACTBOOK 2003,
supra
note
1,
(Field
Listing
Labor
force),
at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2095.html. The informal economy
also includes most professionals such as doctors and lawyers, most other service providers,
and most shopkeepers and sellers of goods in local markets. Interview with Justice
Insaidoo, supra note 204; Interview with Sheila Minta, Solicitor/Barrister, Addae & Twum
Company, Accra, Ghana, December 9, 2003 (notes on file with the author).
265
Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 204.
266
Murphy (2004), supra note 206, at 201 (“perceptions of unfair treatment” appear to
affect trust, and “taxpayer resistance could be sufficiently predicated by decreased levels of
trust”).
267
See Transparency International, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003 215, 220, 225,
264, at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download.htm (Suggesting that although the
government faces much criticism in failing to address corruption within the civil service,
prompting President Kufuor to promise an increase in accountability, Ghana’s perceived
corruption is much lower than that of many of its neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa). In
extreme comparison stands countries like the Congo, where corruption and bribery at all
levels are openly acknowledged as requisite for survival. See Davan Maharaj, When the
push for survival is a full-time job, L.A. TIMES, Part A; Pg. 1, July 11, 2004 (while
government employees are not paid a salary, they still show up for work every day to
collect bribes ranging from “about $5 for a birth certificate to about $100 for an import
license.”) In Benin, a close neighbor to Ghana, bribes collected from traders trying to
import illegal goods into Nigeria provide some 15% of the nation’s revenues. Davan
Maharaj, For sale -- cheap: 'Dead white men's clothing', L.A. TIMES, Part A; Pg. 1, July
14, 2004.
268
The phenomenon appears to exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
See
Transparency International, supra note 267. In the Congo, it is said that “the only ones
who have ever gotten rich are the leaders and those with connections.” See Davan
Maharaj, supra note 267.
269
The perceptions of a few individuals cannot represent national sentiment, nor can
such sentiment, even if widespread, indicate the accuracy of the charge. However, a
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The ability of LDCs to collect sufficient revenue to fund infrastructure
is also challenged by international pressure to open markets and reduce
trade barriers.270 To the extent that Ghana continues to rely heavily upon
trade taxes for its revenue, recent developments in tariff reduction at the
WTO may cause additional revenue shortfalls in the future. Ghana also
faces difficulty in finding consistent resources to fund infrastructure
because success in collecting revenues from excise taxes, royalties,
dividends, and similar payments may depend on fluctuating global market
prices for exported commodities.
Finally, Ghana’s ability to fund infrastructure is further subject to
uncertainty due to its reliance on assistance from foreign donors.271 In
2002, Ghana was the recipient of large amounts of foreign aid, much of
which was connected to the peaceful transition of power through the
democratic process. However, foreign aid fell in 2003, and it is expected to
perception of unfairness and corruption may undermine the efficacy of a tax regime. A
study to quantify the effect of corruption on tax compliance is underway in Tanzania, and
more research is needed in this area. A further issue that may be significant to the tax
collection efforts of LDCs is the perceived misuse of funds by the government, whether as
a result of corruption or the ineptitude of officials. Informally, this author heard many
expressions of dissatisfaction with the ability of the government to provide necessary
services to the citizenry. Since that is a common complaint in developed countries as well,
I do not deal with it here, but only note its existence as an additional potential difficulty in
raising sufficient revenues from individuals. Finally, the extent to which local conditions
and attitudes regarding taxation affect the behavior of multinationals is not conclusively
established. It may be that multinationals generally conduct their business operations
fundamentally in compliance with the laws in force, regardless of the degree to which their
compliance is monitored or enforced, simply because their global operations may be
subject to scrutiny by other governments or the public. However, evidence proving (or
disproving) this theory appears to be lacking in the economic literature.
270
The transition of the U.S. from an agrarian society, “rich in resources but lacking in
capital investment,” to an industrial one is credited in part to tariffs, without which the
transition would have been much slower. See Weisman (2002), supra note 158 at 14; see
also William A. Lovett, Alfred Eckes Jr. & Richard L. Brinkman, U.S. TRADE POLICY:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 45 (2004) (the current association of free trade with
rapid economic growth is “incompatible with American economic history,” which shows
that “[t]he most rapid growth occurred during periods of high protectionism”).
271
In Ghana, 17% of total revenue derives from non-tax sources. 86% of this amount
(or just under 15% of total revenues) derives from grants; the other 14% derives from
receipts from various fees charged by the government for particular services, and from
amounts received in divestiture of state-owned enterprises). Aryeetey, supra note 164, at
30–31. In this respect, Ghana is somewhat better off than many of the other LDCs in SubSaharan Africa, which rely heavily on foreign aid to subsidize their expenditures. For
example, 53% of Uganda’s budget comes from external loans and grants. See Gumisai
Mutume, A New Anti-Poverty Remedy for Africa?, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 4-12, at
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no4/164povty.htm.
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continue its decline as aid is targeted to other countries, notably Iraq.
The consequence is a current budget gap of over 14%.273 An increase in the
overall level of funding by donor countries might alleviate the shortfall.274
However, a subsequent change of policies by the aid donor could cripple the
expectant aid recipient, as foreign aid typically substitutes for domestic
revenue raising efforts rather than complementing them.275
Multinational companies may be expected to increase the government’s
ability to collect revenues by creating a larger wage base for personal
income tax. However, wages in LDCs such as Ghana average $1 per day,
producing little for the government to share.276 If wages are raised through
regulatory action, many multinationals may disengage to seek low wages
elsewhere, since the low cost of labor is often a primary reason
multinationals set up in LDCs.277 Although workers may individually
benefit from employment created by foreign investment even if wages are
only minimally higher than that offered by other local employment, they are
not necessarily placed in a better position with respect to paying taxes.278
Investment protection or insurance—whether made available through
private or public institutions—may promote foreign investment despite a
country’s infrastructural deficiencies. In the U.S., investment protection is
272

Aryeetey, supra note 164.
Ghana’s 2002 budget provided for expected expenses of US$1.1 billion, including
grants, and expected revenues of US$963 million, a 14% shortfall (all figures are based on
current exchange rate of US$1 = Ghanaian ¢8,800).
274
For example, as envisioned by the UN in the Millennium Development Goals.
275
Kaldor (1963), supra note 263, at 410.
276
44.8% of the population of Ghana lives on less than $1 per day; in all of SubSaharan Africa, the figure is close to 46%. See Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank Finds
Global Poverty Down By Half Since 1981, UN NEWSWIRE, April 23, 2004, available at
http://www.un.org/specialrep/ohrlls/News_flash2004/23%20Apr%20World%20Bank%20Finds%20Global.htm.
Globally, it is estimated that about half of the earth’s population lives on under $2 per day,
a fact that has been central to the most recent efforts of the U.S. to combat poverty with
new foreign aid strategies aimed at economic growth. See, e.g., Colin L. Powell, Give Our
Foreign Aid to Enterprising Nations, NEWSDAY (New York), A34, June 11, 2003
(discussing the role of the Millennium Challenge Account in a new strategy of directing
foreign aid to “support for sustainable development” in the face of the ongoing challenge of
widespread global poverty).
277
Hooke, supra note 119, at 18.
278
Nicholas D. Kristof, Inviting All Democrats, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 14,
2004, Section A; Page 19; Column 5 (arguing that “the fundamental problem in the poor
countries of Africa and Asia is not that sweatshops exploit too many workers; it’s that they
don't exploit enough,” as illustrated by the example of a young Cambodian woman who
averages 75 cents a day from picking through a garbage dump ad for whom “the idea of
being exploited in a garment factory—working only six days a week, inside instead of in
the broiling sun, for up to $2 a day—is a dream.”)
273
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provided to U.S. investors through the United States Export-Import Bank (
“Ex-Im Bank”), an independent federal government agency that “assume[s]
credit and country risks the private sector is unable or unwilling to accept,”
through export credit insurance, loan guarantees, and direct loans to U.S
businesses investing in foreign countries.279 For example, Ex-Im Bank
insurance covers the risk of foreign buyers not paying bills owed to U.S.
investors, the risk that a foreign government might restrict the U.S.
company from converting foreign currency to U.S. currency, or even the
risk of loss due to wars.280 This kind of investment protection in effect
substitutes U.S. infrastructure for that existing in LDCs.281
The Ex-Im Bank has a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee
devoted specifically to supporting U.S. investment activity in this region.282
With investment protection available as a substitute for infrastructural
shortcomings, investment in LDCs like Ghana may not be prohibitive. Yet,
the persistently low level of foreign investment in Ghana and Sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole suggests that investment protection is not enough to
overcome the barriers perceived by potential investors.
5. Entrenched Investor Perception
Tax treaties with LDCs may provide little commercial benefit to
investors when little or no income tax is imposed in these countries, so it is
perhaps not surprising that they are correspondingly low on the list of U.S.
treaty priorities.283 Nevertheless tax treaties continue to be promoted for
their ability to increase investment between developed and less-developed
279

See the United States Export-Import Bank website, available at
http://www.exim.gov/.
280
Id.
281
The subsidy is not without controversy. See. e.g., Heather Bennett, House OKs
Measure to Block Loans to Companies Relocating in Tax Havens, 2004 TNI 138-4 (July
19, 2004) (as part of a foreign aid bill, U.S. Export-Import Bank loans would no longer be
made to corporate entities chartered in one of several listed tax havens because, according
to Representative Sanders, who offered the bill, “companies that dodge U.S. taxes should
not be rewarded with taxpayer handouts,” but should “go to the government” of the
applicable tax haven for such privileges).
282
See Ex-Im Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee, at
http://www.exim.gov/about/leadership/africa.htm.
283
See Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5 (stating that the United States
generally does not “conclude tax treaties with jurisdictions that do not impose significant
income taxes, because there is little possibility of the double taxation of income in the
cross-border context that tax treaties are designed to address; with such jurisdictions, an
agreement focused on the exchange of tax information can be very valuable in furthering
the goal of reducing U.S. tax evasion.”).
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countries. One theory for their promotion is that increased investment can
be expected due to the signaling effects of tax treaties.284 For example, it is
suggested that tax treaties may signal a stable investment and business
climate in which treaty partners express their dedication to protecting and
fostering foreign investment.285
Proponents of this argument suggest that in the process of negotiating a
tax treaty, governments of LDCs may subject their operations to increased
transparency and accountability, thus providing additional benefits to
potential investors (as well as domestic taxpayers) in the form of assurances
regarding the proper management of public goods.286 Thus, bilateral tax
treaties may “serve largely to ‘signal that a country is willing to adopt the
international norms’ regarding trade and investment, and hence, that the
country is a safe place to invest, especially ‘in light of the historical

284

Leif Mutén, Double Taxation Treaties Between Industrialised and Developing
Countries, in DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES BETWEEN INDUSTRIALISED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES; OECD AND UN MODELS, A COMPARISON 5, (Kluwer Law and Tax’n Pubs.,
1990).
285
For example, the Secretary of the Treasury proclaimed the importance of signing a
tax treaty with Honduras in 1956, stating that as the first treaty with any Latin American
country, “The agreement may…have a value far beyond its immediate impact on the
economic relations between the United States and Honduras. It may generate among
smaller countries an increased awareness of the need to create an economic atmosphere
that will lend itself to increased private American investment and trade.” Dulles, supra
note 5, at 1444 (1962). Similar sentiment has been expressed in the context of many
treaties, especially those with LDCs, over the years. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX
TREATY AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF
VENEZUELA 61 (Comm. Print. 1999) (“the proposed treaty would provide benefits (as well
as certainty) to taxpayers”); STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 108TH
CONG., TAXATION CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA
(S. Exec. Rpt. 108-11, Mar. 18, 2004) (“in countries where an unstable political climate
may result in rapid and unforeseen changes in economic and fiscal policy, a tax treaty can
be especially valuable to U.S. companies, as the tax treaty may restrain the government
from taking actions that would adversely impact U.S. firms”). These concepts are also
reflected in commentary. See, e.g., ANDERSEN & BLESSING, supra note 10, at ¶ 1.02[3][b]
(in the context of LDCs, “tax treaties provide foreign investors enhanced certainty about
the taxation of the income from their investments”). See also Davies, supra note 209.
(“even a treaty that merely codifies the current practice reduces uncertainty for investors by
lowering the likelihood that a government will unilaterally change its tax policy.”).
286
See, e.g., Gabay (1990) (suggesting that the first advantage to a LDC of entering
into a bilateral tax treaty is the negotiation process itself, because that process creates a
degree of transparency, which in turn promotes “greater rationality in decision making,”
which “can be of great economic benefit to the less developed country.”)
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antipathy that many developing and transition countries have in the past
exhibited to inward investment.’”287
Signaling is a slippery concept because it is difficult to measure whether
signaling is occurring and, if so, whether it impacts investors. The potential
for signaling a stable investment climate through tax treaties with LDCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hampered by the persistence of negative
perceptions about this region’s investment climate.288 Foreign investors in
LDCs often take a regional, rather than national, approach, to investment,
attributing the negative aspects of one country to others in the vicinity.289
Since few Sub-Saharan African countries have tax treaties, and many
countries in the region suffer from civil unrest and economic failure,
Ghana’s ability to demonstrate stability and certainty may achieve little
individual attention from foreign investors unfamiliar with its particular
situation.290
In addition, the signaling effect is tied to a country’s reputation in
upholding its international compacts. Short of terminating a treaty, there is
no formal enforcement mechanism should a country proceed to ignore its
treaty obligations.291 For example, it is difficult to imagine that a tax treaty
287

Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 148, citing Richard J. Vann, International Aspects
of Income Tax, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 726 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 2000).
288
See UNCTAD (1999), supra note 2 at 4, 16 (“little attempt is often made to
differentiate between the individual situations of [the] more than 50 countries of the
continent”).
289
Laura Hildebrandt, Senegal Attracts Investors, But Slowly, 17 AFRICA RECOVERY
2-15 (2003), at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no 2/172inv3.htm
(“foreign investors tend to lump countries together in regions, without making much
distinction among individual countries,” which might explain Senegal’s limited success in
attracting foreign investment despite “relatively good infrastructure [and] a history of
political stability and secular democracy, with decidedly pro-market leanings); UNCTAD
(1999), supra note 2, at iv, 5 (“little attempt is often made to differentiate between the
individual situations of more than 50 countries of the continent”).
290
See, e.g., Laura Hildebrandt (2003), supra note 289, at 15 (“Senegal’s reputation
for stability may be offset by conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Cote d’Ivoire); A
Man of Two Faces, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 27 (“any …plan for Africa’s
redemption will work only if functioning states with reasonably good leaders (South
Africa, Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, Mozambique) can be set apart from the awful
ones….”).
291
In the case of a treaty violation, a taxpayer would request the Competent Authority
of its home country to negotiate with the Competent Authority in the treaty partner country.
For this reason, investors may desire a tax treaty to be in place, so that assistance in
negotiating disputes with a foreign country could be sought from the U.S. Competent
Authority. However, treaties provide no recourse in the event the Competent Authorities
fail to reach a resolution.

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20

2005]

Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid

65

could independently create a sense of stability in a country that would
otherwise be unattractive due to historical failure to protect property rights.
Finally, treaty proponents point to the certainty achieved in establishing
rules consistent with international norms, so that investors will know what
to expect regarding the taxation of their investments in foreign countries.
But signaling of certainty and stability is achieved more directly through
agreements designed to provide these specific benefits. For example,
delivering these benefits is the primary purpose of investment protection
provisions that are included in global and regional trade agreements.292
They are also encompassed in a global network of over 2,100 bilateral
investment protection treaties (BITs).293 Ghana has seventeen such treaties
currently in force.294 The U.S. has 47 in force and relies on these
agreements to protect investment in source countries.295
Investment protection provisions and treaties outline the applicable legal
structure and regulatory framework of the signatory countries, and provide
settlement provisions in the event of disputes between investors and source
country governments.
Common features include guarantees and
compensation in the event of expropriation, guarantees of free transfers of
funds and repatriations of capital and profits, and dispute settlement
provisions.296 The goal of these agreements is to promote transparency,
stability, and predictability for regulatory frameworks in source countries,
292

Stephen S. Golub, Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct Investment
for OECD Countries 6, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 357 (2003).
Most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana, have signed multilateral
agreements dealing with the protection of foreign investment, such as the Convention
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. See
UNCTAD (1999), supra note 2, at 7-8.
293
WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 89-90 (stating that BITs signal a country’s attitude
towards and climate for foreign investment, and that investors “appear to regard BITs as
part of a good investment framework”). Worldwide, there are 2,181 BITs currently in
force, encompassing 176 countries. Id., at xvi. As in the case of tax treaties, significantly
more BITs would be required to achieve global coverage. See supra, note 71.
294
They are with Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. See UNCTAD Bilateral Investment Treaty Database, available at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779.
295
Testimony of Shaun Donnelly (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs , State Department), April 1, 2004, 2004 WL 724003 (
F.D.C.H.) (“BITs have afforded important protections to U.S. investors”). The
U.S. currently has four BITs with LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Mozambique,
Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For a list of U.S. BITs currently in
force, see UNCTAD Bilateral Investment Treaty Database, supra note 294.
296
WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 89.
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and therefore reduce obstacles to the flow of foreign investment.297 BITs
are further bolstered through subsidized loans, loan guarantees, and other
financial assistance made available to foreign investors.298
Even if the stability and certainty signaled by tax treaties could make a
source country that has such agreements more attractive than one that does
not, U.S. investors are unlikely to lobby for tax treaties if they do not have a
direct financial interest at stake, namely, an exposure to taxation that could
be alleviated by treaty.299
The foreign investment patterns of U.S. businesses also imply that tax
treaties may be an insufficient signal to investors.300 First, U.S. investors
will pursue investments in a non-treaty country if the business environment
is sufficiently attractive, even in the absence of a tax treaty.301 For example,
although the U.S. has no treaty with Brazil,302 U.S. foreign direct
investment in Brazil is significant.303 Second, the mere presence of a tax
treaty will not generally overcome an otherwise poor business climate, or
one that deteriorates after a treaty is in place. For example, the U.S. treaty
with Venezuela entered into force in 1999, but flows of U.S. capital to
297

Id.
See supra, note 279 (discussing the role of the U.S. Export-Import Bank in
subsidizing U.S. investors to LDCs).
299
The lobbying efforts of U.S. businesses may not be the most appropriate means of
establishing a list of priorities for new treaties, however it is one of the primary factors
considered by the office of International Tax Counsel in making such decisions. See
Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5.
300
See Mutén, supra note 284 at 4.
301
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 85, at 4, 5 (arguing that tax treaties “make less
difference to domestic taxpayers investing abroad,” especially if taxes are low in source
countries).
302
Brazil is one of the South American countries that refuses to negotiate with the U.S.
due to the tax sparing controversy. See Laurey, supra note 215, at 493 (citing an
unpublished Brazilian Tax Sparing Position Paper); Mitchell, supra note 11 at 213;
Guttentag, supra note 4 at 451, 452. The latest U.S. discussions with Brazil were held in
1992. As Brazil continued to insist on tax sparing and the U.S. refuses to continue
negotiations with countries that insist on including such a provision, no further meetings
are planned and there have been no recent activities to date. See John Venuti, Manal S.
Corwin, Steven R. Lainoff & Paul M. Schmidt, Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and
International Agreements, 33-8 TAX MANAGEMENT INT’L J. 480, 483 (August 13, 2004)
(updated monthly).
303
As valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in and net
outstanding loans to Brazilian affiliates), U.S. foreign direct investment in Brazil is
currently valued at $30 billion. At 1.7% of total U.S. foreign direct investment, Brazil’s
market for US foreign direct investment is not far behind that of some developed countries,
including Spain (with 2.1% of U.S. foreign direct investment) and Australia (with 2.3%).
Borga & Yorgason (2004), supra note 96, at 42, 49.
298
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Venezuela subsequently dropped sharply due to “concerns over regulations
and political instability in the country.”304
Finally, some investors may not necessarily want a tax treaty because
such agreements usually include measures that prevent tax evasion, as
discussed above.305 Thus while a tax treaty may send positive signals to
investors, they may as likely send negative signals to the extent they lead
the way to stronger enforcement of tax laws. Supporting tax evasion is
clearly indefensible as a policy for encouraging investment in LDCs but the
benefits of such opportunities to existing investors, and the cost of
eliminating such opportunities, cannot be ignored.306
Nevertheless, easing enforcement and administration of the tax laws
may be an alternative reason to continue expanding the U.S. tax treaty
network, from the perspective of potential LDC treaty partners.307 For
example, the information exchange provisions might enable Ghana to
extend its current, basically territorial, regime, to a worldwide regime.308

304

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI in brief: Venezuela
(2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_ib_ve_en.pdf.
305
In the past, tax treaties may have contributed to tax evasion by creating
opportunities for “treaty shopping” through the use of multi-country tiered structures such
as the one shut down in Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 TC 925 (1971). In that
case, the Honduras-U.S. treaty then in force was used to channel interest payments free of
tax from the U.S. to the Bahamas. The Honduras-U.S. treaty was terminated in 1966,
before the case was decided but in connection with these kinds of structures, deemed to be
void of any “economic or business purpose” by the Tax Court. Treaty shopping has since
been curtailed in newer treaties and protocols by means of stronger limitation of benefits
provisions. See Arnold (2001), supra note 247, at 73-74.
306
Just as in the cases of deferral and bank secrecy, the private sector can be expected
to protect tax advantages regardless of whether they comport with a coherent tax policy.
307
Obtaining cooperation in tax enforcement through information sharing provisions is
a major factor in the completion of treaties from the perspective of the U.S. For example,
the newly-ratified tax treaty with Sri Lanka was originally negotiated almost 20 years ago
but only entered into force this year. Ten years of the delay were due to Sri Lanka’s
reluctance in accepting U.S. requests regarding information exchange. See Colin L.
Powell, Letters of Transmittal and Submittal, Doc 2004-7257 (Oct. 28, 2003). The fact
that, as in the case of Ghana, Sri Lanka’s statutory rates and tax incentive regimes indicate
that the domestic tax regime is as or more favorable than that provided under treaty
suggests that under that treaty, prevention of double taxation plays a much less significant
role than prevention of tax evasion.
308
See US Model, art. 26. For example, when Venezuela entered into a tax treaty with
the United States, its tax regime was territorial: Venezuela imposed no tax on the foreign
income of its residents. Its tax treaty with the U.S. included the typical exchange of
information provision, which would theoretically allow Venezuela to pursue its residents
who engaged in activities outside of the country, and Venezuela subsequently expanded its
jurisdiction to encompass residence-based taxes. Convention for the Avoidance of Double
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The benefit of such a regime would depend on the amount of savings
shifted to the United States by Ghanaian persons, before and after the treaty.
Presumably this is a relatively tiny amount by global standards,309 but it
might be significant to the overall revenue picture in Ghana. However,
Ghana’s limited tax treaty network significantly restricts the ability to
enlarge its taxing jurisdiction, since Ghanaians could simply choose a
location other than the U.S. for their offshore activities, avoiding Ghanaian
tax even under a worldwide system.310
Moreover, as in the case of investment protection, the benefits of
information exchange are as readily—and more broadly—achieved through
agreements specifically addressing this issue. Information exchange is
comprehensively addressed in TIEAs, which are generally bilateral, and
through multilateral agreements such as the OECD Tax Information
Exchange Agreement.311 Under the US Model TIEA, assistance in tax
enforcement and collection are extended not only to income taxes but to
other taxes as well, making such agreements potentially more effective than
tax treaties in fulfilling the goal of improved tax administration and
enforcement.312
Absent reduction of double taxation, the non-commercial benefits of tax
treaties appear incapable of independently exerting a significant influence
on U.S. foreign investment, and some of the aspects of tax treaties may tend
to discourage such investment. Ultimately, the value of continued
expansion of the U.S. tax treaty network to LDCs may therefore be

Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, Jan. 25, 1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 27, TIAS.
309
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs compiles data regarding direct investment in
the U.S., but Ghana is included only collectively with the rest of Africa excluding South
Africa. Inbound direct investment from this region is valued at $1.8 billion, which
represents less than 0.2% of that from Europe. Borga & Yorgason (2004), supra note 96,
at 51.
310
Ghana would not generally benefit from the larger U.S. tax treaty network since the
exchange of information is limited to information that is relevant to the two contracting
states only. US Model, art. 24.
311
This agreement has been signed by the U.S. and Canada, among others.
312
The U.S. entered into tax treaties with many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in
the Caribbean simultaneously by territorial extension with their various colonial powers
(from 1957-1958) and terminated most of these treaties simultaneously three decades later
(in 1983-1984). The U.S. subsequently entered into TIEAs only with the Caribbean
nations. The U.S. has trade agreements with countries in both the Caribbean and SubSaharan Africa, sends foreign aid to both regions, and has expressed a desire to increase
investment, trade and aid to both regions. Yet there is no agreement on tax matters with
respect to the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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extremely limited in the context of a global tax climate that reflects the
circumstances illustrated in this case study.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pursuit of tax treaties to achieve investment and aid goals is
undermined by competing tax regimes, including domestic U.S. rules that
provide relief of current U.S. tax burdens in respect of foreign income
earned by multinationals. To the extent multinationals can escape U.S.
taxation simply by investing abroad, the U.S. fosters tax competition
throughout the world as foreign countries compete to attract the U.S. capital
fleeing taxation at home. As a result of this international tax competition,
and a corresponding divergence in tax mix between developed and less
developed countries, much of the tax ostensibly relieved under tax treaties
no longer exists to a significant extent with respect to investment in many
LDCs.
As a result, tax treaties with these countries may offer few commercial
benefits to investors. Tax treaties may provide non-commercial benefits to
partner countries and investors, by signaling stability or suitability, or
providing certainty.
However, these incidental benefits are likely
insufficient to significantly impact investment in many LDCs, particularly
those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, as the case study of Ghana
demonstrates, much of the conventional wisdom about the impact of tax
treaties on the global flow of investment does not apply in the context of
many of the LDCs most in need of realizing these benefits.
Tax treaties represent a significant opportunity cost for LDCs, diverting
attention and resources away from the exploration of more direct ways to
increase cross-border investment.
Thus, every potential tax treaty
relationship with LDCs should be approached critically. If a tax treaty
cannot be expected to provide sufficient benefits to investors, it should not
be pursued simply to include the target country in the network of treaty
countries in a myopic adherence to traditional notions about the
international tax and business community. After decades of adherence to
the promise of tax treaties, their inability to deliver in situations involving
LDCs must be acknowledged. If the U.S. is truly committed to increasing
trade and investment to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, alternative ways
to achieve these goals must be pursued.
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